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Abstract
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS: REALITY AND NORMATIVITY
by
JASON V. ALTILIO
Adviser: Professor Bernard Baumrin
Close interpersonal relationships are a part of everyone’s life at some point. For most people
these relationships are actually prominent parts of their everyday lives. As such, it is important to
figure out whether and how they fit into different normative theories of ethics. Relationships like
those that exist as romantic couples, close friendships, and parent-child relationships share certain
features with other close interpersonal relationships that I define as “intimate relationships” in this
dissertation. Intimate relationships are those that exist between people when they wish one another
well, act for one another, do so mutually, treat one another as ends in themselves, and trust one
another. If a normative theory is to account for moral value in intimate relationships then it must
meet a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. My purpose in this dissertation is to synthesize
these conditions after analyzing four distinct normative theories’ accounts of moral value in intimate
relationships: Kantianism, G.E. Moore’s consequentialism, Aristotle’s virtue ethics, and Virginia
Held’s ethics of care. These four theorists’ approaches to normative ethics were selected because
each theorist claims to value intimate relationships yet each provides a different account of that
value. I first show that each theorist considers intimate relationships to be morally valuable and then
analyze their theories’ abilities to account for that value using four value terms: intrinsic good,
extrinsic good, instrumental good, and final good. I then identify the components of each normative
theory that either allow it to capture or prevent it from capturing the moral value of intimate
relationships. This leads to the conclusion that a normative theory must allow for value in each of
the components of an intimate relationship and appraise the relationships themselves to be more than
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instrumentally valuable in order to account for any moral value in the relationships. Those people
who treat the intimate relationships in their lives as having moral value will be able to gauge the
applicability of a particular normative theory to their lives by that theory’s ability to meet the

aforementioned criteria.
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Intimate Relationships: Reality and Normativity: Introduction
Close interpersonal relationships are undeniably part of real human lives. Everyone has
parents, most people have at least one close friend, and many people have siblings, children, or
other family members with whom they have close relationships. Some of these relationships are
ones people are born into and others are formed, but without question these relationships are
significant to the people that create and foster them.
The constant presence of such relationships in real lives has given rise to many theories
about relationships as well as the role they should play in human lives. Questions about close
interpersonal relationships have been addressed in works of philosophy and literature. While
Western thought owes a great debt to the authors of antiquity and the middle ages, I would like
to focus on Giovanni Boccaccio’s Decameron as a work that tackled these issues and in doing so
influenced, or at least prefigured, a great deal of subsequent thought and literature about intimate
relationships.1 The stories of Decameron are especially interesting because they detail several
different components of close interpersonal relationships that are of enduring importance.
One noteworthy characteristic of the stories of Decameron is that they do not necessarily
equate sex with love. This is an important distinction for the purposes of this dissertation
because the close interpersonal relationships that will be defined in chapter three as intimate may
or may not include a sexual component: the love at the heart of these morally valuable
relationships is not dependent on sex. Many stories in Decameron detail relationships that
involve sex without love and others which involve love without sex.

1

For example, there is evidence that stories from Decameron inspired or at least bear a strong resemblance to stories
in Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales and a couple of Shakespeare’s plays. McGrady, D. (1977). “Chaucer and
Decameron Reconsidered.” The Chaucer Review, 1-26. and Wright, H. G. (1955). “How Did Shakespeare Come to
Know Decameron?.”The Modern Language Review, 45-48.
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For example, the fifth story of the third day of Decameron describes the relationship
between Ricciardo the Magnifico and the wife of Signoir Francesco. Ricciardo is a young
wealthy man without any court status that is so well mannered and dressed that he is called the
Magnifico as a sign of respect. Signoir Francesco is a Knight who is stingy despite possessing
an abundance of riches and is married to a beautiful and virtuous woman. Ricciardo has for a
long time secretly courted Signoir Francesco’s wife without any success. Word of Ricciardo’s
interest in her eventually makes it to Signoir Francesco. Someone suggests to Signoir Francesco
that if he asks Ricciardo for his horse Ricciardo will give it to him for love of Signoir
Francesco’s wife. Though Signoir Francesco can afford to buy the horse he jumps at the
opportunity to get such a splendid animal for free. Under the pretense of buying the horse,
Signoir Francesco invites Ricciardo to his home. Ricciardo does, in fact, offer the horse to
Signoir Francesco for free under the condition that Ricciardo can speak to his wife out of anyone
else’s earshot. Signoir Francesco agrees after privately telling his wife not to say anything in
response to Ricciardo’s words. Signoir Francesco’s wife is displeased with the request since she
does not want to hear Ricciardo’s words or entreaties. Nevertheless, she agrees to comply with
her husband’s request. Upon doing so and hearing Ricciardo’s words “she began to finde that in
her, which (before) she never felt, namely Love.”2 Though she keeps her promise to her husband
and does not offer any verbal response, the quick thinking Ricciardo sees the non-verbal cues of
someone affected by his words and figures out Signoir Francesco’s plan. Ricciardo then speaks
as if speaking for Signoir Francesco’s wife and expresses the gratitude and sentiments that she
could not verbalize. Signoir Francesco receives his horse and leaves for Milan as his wife is left
to contemplate Ricciardo’s words and suggestion for a subsequent meeting.
2

Boccaccio, G. 1620. Decameron 3 Different Translations by John Florio, John Payne and J.M. Rigg in 1 eBook.
Retrieved from http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-decameron-giovanniboccaccio/1116823655?ean=9788074844263. pg 247.
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This story makes the distinction between sex and love quite clear. Though Signoir
Francesco and his wife had certainly had sex before his wife’s conversation with Ricciardo, it
was Ricciardo’s speech that first engendered feelings of love in Signoir Francesco’s wife.
Furthermore, this love is felt by Signoir Francesco’s wife and by Ricciardo without them having
had sex with one another. Additionally, at the end of the story the reader is left in suspense
about whether the two lovers ever physically consummated their love.
Boccaccio also included stories that explore familial love in Decameron. This indicates
that Boccaccio saw relationships marked by familial love as worthy of consideration alongside
those relationships containing a romantic sense of love.
The eighth story of the second day provides one example of such familial love. In this
story the Count D’Angiers is appointed Governor of France while the King and his son are away
at war. In the course of fulfilling his obligations the Count catches the eye of the prince’s wife.
However, when the honorable Count rejects her advances she accuses him of attempted rape.
Knowing the danger he faces the Count quickly flees from France and arranges care for his
daughter and son. The Count himself begins a very tough life as serving man to an Earl in
Ireland. The Count’s daughter, Violenta, through several turns of good fortune marries the son
of one of the King of England’s marshalls. Lewes, the Count’s son, through similar good fortune
marries into the position of another of the King of England’s marshalls situated in Wales.
Eighteen years after the Count first fled France he leaves Ireland to search for his children. He is
overjoyed at his children’s circumstances and considers all the hardships he has endured in
Ireland as nothing in light of his discovery. Without revealing himself as Violenta’s father or his
grandchildren’s grandfather, he is taken into Violenta’s house because of his grandchildren’s
natural affection for him. Meanwhile, the prince of France’s wife, now Queen, becomes ill and
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confesses her sin against the Count asking that he and his children be reinstated to their former
honor if they still live. After hearing an official proclamation to this effect, the Count finally
reveals himself to his son and son-in-law. The Count then has his son-in-law present him to the
King of France to claim the reward promised in the proclamation as a retroactive dowry for his
daughter’s hand in marriage. Finally, the Count is also reunited with his daughter and the entire
family is elated as the Count is reinstated to an even higher position in France than he held
before he was forced to flee from the country.
The inclusion of this story among those of Decameron shows that the love shared
between a father and his children is worthy of mention alongside the love shared between
romantic couples. The Count’s decision to remain anonymous even after finding out his
children’s prestigious lots in life shows that he loves his children for their own sakes. He gives
up the opportunity to be released from his lowly position in life so as not to upset his daughter’s
happiness. Only after he knows that revealing himself will help his children does he do so.
Additionally, his children’s response to seeing their father alive again shows the love they clearly
feel toward him. The number of stories detailing romantic love in Decameron may far outstrip
those addressing familial love, however the stories that deal with familial love never feel out of
place amongst the one hundred stories. Though different, the two categories of love are both
significant when describing love’s place in actual human lives.
Another reason that Boccaccio’s Decameron is important is that many of its stories stress
the value of mutuality in close interpersonal relationships. The stories as a whole emphasize the
point that close interpersonal relationships cannot be unidirectional. In the stories of Decameron
love must be felt by both members of the relationship toward one another for the relationship to
work.
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One particularly poignant example of mutuality’s necessity in close interpersonal
relationships appears in the ninth story of the fifth day of Decameron. In this story Frederigo
falls in love with a Gentlewoman named Giana. In an effort to curry Giana’s favor Frederigo
spares no expense to lavish her with many expensive gifts and honors. However, Giana has no
feelings for Frederigo and is unmoved by his expenditures. Nevertheless, Frederigo spends the
majority of his fortune trying to garner the affection of Giana and is ultimately left with only a
small farm, a couple of servants, and a treasured hunting falcon. Frederigo’s love for Giana
never falters and only increases, yet he is unable to continue his extravagant attempts to win her
heart. Eventually Giana’s husband dies and she moves to the country near where Frederigo’s
small farm is located. Her son enjoys hunting with trained dogs and falcons and comes to greatly
desire Frederigo’s falcon, yet cannot bear to ask him for it since it is obvious that it is one of
Frederigo’s only remaining valuable possessions. Giana’s son suddenly falls very ill and tells his
mother that if she can obtain Frederigo’s falcon he will surely recover. Giana feels guilty asking
Frederigo for the one possession that still gives him joy knowing that her inability to reciprocate
the love Frederigo feels for her is in part responsible for Frederigo’s situation. Nevertheless, her
love for her son prompts her to visit Frederigo with the intention of asking for his falcon. When
she arrives Frederigo tells her that he considers all his losses insignificant in light of his feelings
for her and that he will happily accept the honor of having her dine with him. Unfortunately,
Frederigo has no food worthy of Giana and decides to have his prized falcon cooked for her
pleasure. Giana and her attendant enjoy dinner without knowing they are eating the falcon she
had come to request. When she requests the falcon of Frederigo after dinner, Frederigo is
devastated that he cannot grant her request. Giana deeply appreciates Frederigo’s gesture, but is
sad to return home without the falcon for her son. Soon afterward her son dies. After grieving
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and further reflecting on Frederigo’s kindness Giana tells her brethren that she will only accept
Frederigo as her second husband, despite their protests to the contrary. The two are in fact
married and “…they lived, and loved together in equal joy and happinesse.”3
This story shows the necessity of mutual feelings of love to the existence of close
interpersonal relationships. Frederigo loved Giana and ardently sought to prove his love to her
and engender similar feelings in her. In fact, he spent all his wealth in his efforts to win her
heart. Nevertheless, the relationship could not become a close one until Giana was able to
reciprocate that love at the end of the story.
Trust is another part of close interpersonal relationships that the stories of Decameron
stress. Many of the problems that the characters in Decameron’s stories face are caused by a
lack of trust. Several stories go as far as showing how close interpersonal relationships break
down without trust.
Perhaps the clearest example of this appears in the fifth story of the seventh day of
Decameron. A very rich merchant living in Arimino was married to a beautiful woman. This
merchant, however, was extremely jealous and because he thought her beauty would cause
others to fall in love with her he kept her locked away in his home. As the story states “many
persons condemned to death, have en[j]oyed larger libertie in their imprisonment.”4 The
merchant’s jealousy, though, was unfounded as his wife had not thought to love another.
Eventually the wife, justifiably upset by her confinement and overall situation, decided to
attempt a tryst as revenge for her poor treatment by her husband and as a reprieve from the
boredom she experienced. Despite her confinement she is able to contact a young Gentleman
named Philippo. Then, she tells her husband that she needs to confess her sins as the feast of

3
4

Ibid. pg 484.
Ibid. pg 582.
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Christmas approaches. He allows her to go, but specifies the particular church and Chaplain that
she is to confess to and installs himself in the confessional. Despite his preparations to the
contrary, she recognizes her husband as the confessor. She tells her husband of a fictitious friar
who she sleeps with every night despite all the locked doors and her husband’s presence. She
then has her husband, disguised as a priest, promise not to tell her husband of her sins. As her
husband sets himself up with armor and weapons to meet the made up friar at the door, the wife
invites Philippo to climb over a wall and through a window into her room. The same scenario
repeats itself for many nights until her husband is too frustrated to continue his watch. Finally,
he accuses his wife of the sins she revealed to him. She replies that he was the friar with whom
she had been sleeping as she recognized him as her confessor and embellished the story to teach
him a lesson. Her husband, unaware of her actual unfaithfulness, does learn his lesson and gives
up his jealous ways. As a result, his wife, free to enjoy living a more normal life, no longer felt
it necessary to be unfaithful to her husband.
This story emphasizes the importance of trust to close interpersonal relationships by
examining both the possibility of a close relationship without trust and a close relationship with
trust. The merchant and his wife’s relationship was stifled by the merchant’s lack of trust in his
wife. The jealousy the merchant felt as a result of his lack of trust drove his wife to find a more
satisfying relationship with Philippo. However, once the merchant began to trust his wife his
relationship with her was revitalized to the point that she no longer needed to find
companionship with someone else despite having a greater opportunity to do so.
There are even a few stories in Decameron that suggest the importance of treating others
in close interpersonal relationships as ends in themselves. Though the idea of treating others in
interpersonal relationships as ends in themselves is not made explicit in any of Decameron’s
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stories, several of them show the pitfalls of failing to treat the other as an individual with his or
her own desires and goals.
The tenth story of the second day of Decameron is one such story. Signoir Ricciardo de
Chinzica, a wise judge of poor physique, decides to take a beautiful young wife named
Bertolomea. However, on his wedding night his attempt to consummate the marriage fails to
satisfy his new wife. In response to this, and to avoid further discomfort on his own part, he
explains to his wife that almost every day is a holy day on which it is inappropriate for the
couple to have sex. As a result, Bertolomea becomes increasingly frustrated with her husband’s
lack of interest in her desires. One day, on a recreational fishing trip, Bertolomea is kidnapped
by a famous pirate named Pagamino. While she is at first very upset, Pagamino’s kind treatment
of her wins her over. Ricciardo de Chinzica is able to meet Pagamino and ask for his wife to be
returned to him. Pagamino tells Ricciardo that he will let Bertolomea leave with him if she so
desires it. When Bertolomea comes before Pagamino and Ricciardo she acts as if she does not
know Ricciardo. Ricciardo gets Pagamino to allow Bertolomea to speak with him privately at
which point she tells Ricciardo that she knows who he is but that he does not know her because
he has blatantly ignored her desires and interests by treating her more as student than a wife. She
goes on to argue that her parents too ignored her good when they promised her to Ricciardo as a
wife. Conversely, Pagamino treats her as a true wife: with honor and respect. Despite his
protests Ricciardo is forced to leave Pagamino without his wife. As a result he is disgraced and
miserable in his home town and dies shortly thereafter. At that point Pagamino and Bertolomea
officially get married.
Bertolomea is frustrated and upset by her treatment at the hands of Ricciardo because her
wishes, goals, and desires are ignored. She makes the same complaint against her parents. In
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effect, she is unhappy with those relationships because she is not being treated as an end in
herself, but as a means to something else. Ricciardo marries her because he thinks his prestige as
a judge entitles him to a beautiful wife. In contemporary vernacular Ricciardo treats Bertolomea
as a “trophy wife.” Her parents, by marrying her to a man unfit for her, also seem to be after
some end that is not in line with Bertolomea’s wishes. Pagamino, despite holding a much less
respectable post than Ricciardo, earns a close relationship with Bertolomea’s by treating her with
respect and acknowledging her own wishes. For example, when he tells Ricciardo that
Bertolomea is free to return to him if that is what she so desires he treats Bertolomea as an end in
herself. For that reason, Bertolomea decides to pursue a relationship with Pagamino rather than
Ricciardo.
Decameron touches on each of the pieces of a close interpersonal relationship that will be
discussed in chapter three as defining features of what this dissertation terms “intimate
relationships”: love, mutuality, trust, and treating the other as an end in himself or herself.
Chapter three will add to this list that those people involved in intimate relationships must wish
one another well and act for one another. These characteristics are discussed in the stories
already mentioned as well as most other stories in Decameron. While no one story in the one
hundred that make up Decameron describes all six of these components clearly, the fact that each
of them plays a role in some story shows that interpersonal relationships with these traits
captured the attention of Boccaccio and his readers. The interest in what will be referred to as
“intimate relationships” is not a new phenomenon. Those authors whose own stories or writing
were influenced or prefigured by Decameron show, through their own work, that this interest is
enduring.
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These relationships, then, have long been and still are a part of human lives. They are
also significant and interesting else there would not be so many influential works of literature
detailing their existence. The question that remains, the question that this dissertation will
examine, is whether and how that significance is translated into moral value by particular
normative theories.
Despite the long history of interest in close interpersonal relationships and the roles they
play in real human lives, the question of how they fit into moral life has not been tackled
philosophically as rigorously and as often as it has been in the last fifty years. In 1971 Elizabeth
Telfer gave a talk on friendship at the Meeting of the Aristotelian Society in London and later
published the talk in the meeting’s proceedings.5 The paper aims to address three questions
about friendship “… what it is, how morality bears on it, and why it is thought to be important.”6
Whether intentional or not, whether causal or coincidental, Telfer’s attempt at defining
friendship and exploring its place in normative theories preceded several important papers and
books over the next few decades on the subject. Two years after Telfer published her article,
Bernard Williams’ “A Critique of Utilitarianism” attacked utilitarianism’s concept of negative
responsibility on the grounds that it alienates people from their commitments to projects and
relationships.7 That same year, 1973, Michael Stocker published “The Schizophrenia of Modern
Ethical Theories” which criticizes Moore’s consequentialist theory of ethics, among others, for
its inability to endorse loving others as ends in themselves.8 Both Williams and Stocker went on
to publish other articles that focused and bolstered the claims they made in their 1973 papers.

5

Telfer, E. 1971. “Friendship.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1971: 223–241.
Ibid. pg 223.
7
Williams, B. 1973. “A Critique of Utilitarianism.” In Utiltiarianism For and Against, New York: Cambridge
University Press, p. 116. (1998)
8
Stocker, M. 1973. “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.” The Journal of Philosophy 73(14): pgs 458459.
6
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1977 saw the publication of three articles that explored the connections between Aristotle’s
ethics and friendship by Julia Annas and John Cooper. In 1980 Lawrence Blum published
Friendship, Altruism and Morality, the first part of which is devoted to criticizing Kantianism for
its inability to explain and value close interpersonal relationships.9 In the same year Sara
Ruddick published “Maternal Thinking” as the beginning of an alternative way of doing ethics
that is grounded in the relationship of mothering.10 This was followed in 1982 and 1984 by
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development and Nel
Noddings’ Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, respectively.11 Both
books continued in the tract that Ruddick had started a couple years earlier: they proposed
alternate approaches to ethics grounded in interpersonal relationships rather than the well
established classifications of deontology and consequentialism. Peter Railton also published
“Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” in 1984 as a consequentialist
answer to the problems posed by Williams and Stocker.12 Railton’s article explicitly attempts to
make room for the concept of friendship within the consequentialist framework. In 1985
Ferdinand Shoeman published yet another article on the value of friendship in Aristotle’s moral
theory.13 In 1987 Neera Badhwar published “Friends as Ends in Themselves” as a detailed
analysis of friendships in which the friends treat one another as ends in themselves. In the last
paragraph Badhwar makes a connection between friendships and morality.14 In 1991 Badhwar

9

Blum, L. A. 1980. Friendship, Altruism and Morality. New York: Routledge.
Ruddick, S. (1980). Maternal thinking. Feminist Studies, 2.
11
Gilligan, C. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. and Noddings, N. 1984. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Los
Angeles: University of California Press. 2003.
12
Railton, P. 1984. “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs
13(2): 134-171.
13
Schoeman, F. 1985. “Aristotle on the Good of Friendship.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63(3): 269-282.
14
Badhwar, N. K. 1987. “Friends as Ends in Themselves.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48(1): 1–
23.
10
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focused more explicitly on the ties between friendship and morality in an article criticizing
consequentialism for on its inability to value the relationships she defined in her 1987 article.
Finally, in an introduction to a reader that Badhwar edited which was published in 1993, she
undertakes the project of examining several different normative theories’ abilities to explain and
value friendships as a means of introducing the articles collected in the reader.15
While the above history is far from complete, it highlights some of the more significant
work on the ability of specific normative theories to incorporate the value of close interpersonal
relationships between 1971 and 1987. Many more articles on the connections between ethics
and interpersonal relationships have been published since 1987, but 1987 is significant because it
marked the first of Badhwar’s papers on friendship and its relation to normative ethics. Her
interest in the topic grew and deepened into the closest approximation to the project that this
dissertation takes up: a systematic analysis of multiple normative theories’ failures to account
and successes in accounting for the value of close interpersonal relationships.
Badhwar’s attempt at this project was impeded by several factors. First, the purpose of
the project was to serve as an introduction for a reader. This prevented Badhwar from
developing her argument in sufficient detail. Second, the value terms she uses in the article
obscure differences between the theories she examines.16 Third, she does not compare the
conclusions she reaches about each normative theory that she examines. As a result she is
unable to draw any wider conclusions about normative theories in general. These are three
problems I plan to avoid in this dissertation.
I will analyze four theories of ethics in order to show that any normative theory which
hopes to account for the value of intimate relationships (a sort of close interpersonal relationship)

15
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Page 12

must meet a series of necessary and sufficient conditions. So long as one admits that such
relationships are morally valuable, this set of necessary and sufficient conditions is an invaluable
tool with which to appraise any normative theory’s practical plausibility.
In order to synthesize the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that a normative
theory must meet to account for the value of intimate relationships several concepts needed in
the analysis of the normative theories must be defined. Since value itself is a multifaceted term
the several most relevant and theoretically neutral classifications of value will be identified and
precisely defined in chapter two. Only then can the value terms be useful in an unbiased analysis
of very different normative approaches to close interpersonal relationships. In chapter three, the
close interpersonal relationships themselves will be examined as the term “intimate relationship”
is defined to be more inclusive than the term “friendship.” The value terms explained in chapter
two will then be applied in the succeeding four chapters to analyze the way in which Kantianism,
G.E. Moore’s consequentialism, Aristotle’s virtue theory, and Virginia Held’s ethics of care
assign value to the relationships defined in chapter three.
These four theorists and the theories they propose have been selected for two reasons.
First, each theorist explicitly or implicitly claims that intimate relationships, or some subset of
intimate relationships, are morally valuable. Second, each theory assigns intimate relationships a
different sort of value. The respective failures and successes of each theory to account for the
value of intimate relationships serve as premises in the argument for a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions. Accordingly, the first half of chapters three through six will show that the
theorist being investigated discusses interpersonal relationships that qualify as intimate
relationships and argues that such relationships have moral value. The later part of each chapter
will examine whether each theory is able to account for the normative value of intimate
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relationships that the theorist acknowledges they possess. Then, chapter eight will collect the
conclusions of the analyses that take place in chapters three through six and use them to create
the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that can be used to appraise any normative theory’s
ability to value intimate relationships. For actual people who treat their intimate relationships as
having moral value these conditions will be a guidepost toward determining which normative
theories are applicable in their lives.
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Chapter 2 – Value from Intrinsic to Instrumental
There are four categories of value that will be used in this dissertation to discuss the
moral worth of interpersonal relationships: intrinsic, extrinsic, instrumental, and final value.
These terms are used imprecisely and even interchangeably leading to confusion in debates about
moral theorists’ appraisals of interpersonal relationships. This problem becomes more
significant when one attempts to compare the value of interpersonal relationships across different
moral theories. In order to address this problem and figure out how intimate relationships are
valued one must clearly define these four kinds of value and show that they are theoretically
neutral. It will be helpful to start with an analysis of the many possible interpretations of the
most general notion of positive value in ethics, or the good, and then move on to a more detailed
examination of the specific senses of the term that are most relevant to a discussion of
interpersonal relationships’ value. W.D. Ross and A.C. Ewing examine many possible meanings
of the word “good” in their works and each will be reviewed to see whether it is significant to the
present inquiry. Both refer to G.E. Moore’s attempt to answer the question ‘What things have
intrinsic value and in what degrees?’ in Principia Ethics.17 He explains the concept of intrinsic
value further in “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” hereafter referred to as CIV.18 While doing
so, Moore also lays the foundation for a definition of extrinsic value that will help categorize the
kind of good that interpersonal relationships may possess. Fred Feldman examines Moore’s
view and offers several competing definitions of intrinsic value in his article “Hyperventilating
about Intrinsic Value.”19 Each of these must be discussed to figure out whether Moore’s concept
of intrinsic good is the most useful for an analysis of value across different moral theories.
17
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Christine Korsgaard considers Moore’s view of intrinsic value too and concludes that final value
should be defined as distinct from intrinsic value.20 In so doing, Korsgaard also sets up
instrumental goodness as distinct from extrinsic goodness.
Part I: Various Uses of “Good”
“Good” and “positively valuable” will be used interchangeably in this dissertation; yet,
both phrases have many meanings in the English language and they vary significantly. Saying
that a particular relationship is good can therefore mean many different things. In chapter four of
Ewing’s The Definition of Good, hereafter DG, he identifies ten different ways to define the
word “good.” 21 Many of the same definitions are discussed by Ross in chapter three of The
Right and the Good, hereafter RG.22 These definitions can be roughly grouped into four
categories: instrumental goodness, comparative goodness, specific goodness, and intrinsic
goodness.23 Some of these are vital to the discussion of intimate relationships which follows this
chapter, and others are beside the point of this dissertation.
Ewing’s first four definitions of “good” all relate to what this dissertation will refer to as
instrumental goodness. Instrumental goodness in its most general form is Ewing’s fourth
definition of “good.” Rather than use the term “instrumental goodness” Ewing simply writes
that something good in the fourth sense of the word is a means to an intrinsically good end (DG
113). This general type of good is also exemplified by Ewing’s first three definitions of “good.”
Ewing first identifies goodness with something which is pleasant or liked (DG 112). Next, he
examines the idea that “goodness” can be attributed to that which will satisfy one’s desires.
Ewing’s third definition for “good” is performing a particular function efficiently; this is one of
20
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the “root ideas” expressed by “good” according to Ross (DG 112, RG 65). In fact, Ross writes
that the first two definitions that Ewing mentions reduce to this third definition (DG 112, RG 65).
Particular relationships can be, and often are, good in each of these ways. However, these are not
the uses of “good” on which this dissertation will focus. Intimate relationships do provide
pleasure, satisfy desires, and perform certain functions efficiently. Yet, if the entire goodness of
intimate relationships is captured by any of these features, then their goodness can be more
generally described as instrumental: good for the sake of the effects they produce. Whether the
relevant effect is the production of pleasure, satisfaction of desire, or performance of some
function will be beside the point because the more general characterization of this goodness as
instrumental will be sufficient for the arguments in the following chapters. Instrumental
goodness will be discussed again later in this chapter as a contrast to final goodness.
The fifth definition of “good” described by Ewing also deals with efficiency: rather than
describing something or someone that is efficiently performing a function, this meaning of
“good” is for something or some action to be efficient (DG 113-114). The difference between
definitions three and five is the difference between calling the swing of a baseball bat good for
causing a homerun and calling the same swing good because of its internal mechanics, even if it
results in a strikeout. In a sense, Ewing’s fifth definition is a comparative evaluation in light
other things of the same kind. Ross identifies a similar meaning of “good” when he writes that it
can refer to an object or person that is an above average member of its kind (RG 66-67). Ross
explicitly states that good in this sense is used as a comparative to indicate that a thing is better
than the average of its kind. This directly links to Ewing’s fifth definition when Ewing writes
that the “good of a species” meaning of “good” reduces to definition five when it is meant to
indicate that a thing is efficient at doing what that sort of thing does (DG 117). Relationships
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can be compared to one another in this way too. Certain relationships could be termed more
efficient and thus better than others; in other words, certain relationships might fulfill the
defining features of that sort of relationship better than others. The goal of this dissertation,
however, is to examine the value of a particular category of relationship as a whole rather than to
make comparisons within the category. Therefore, the fifth definition of “good” that Ewing
identifies will not be relevant to this dissertation.
The eighth, ninth, and tenth definitions of “good” that Ewing identifies apply to
characteristics, actions, and persons respectively. The eighth type of good describes a
characteristic that makes objects that possess it good (DG 116). According to Ewing, this type of
characteristic can make an object good intrinsically or as a means to an intrinsically good end
(DG 116). Ewing’s ninth and tenth definitions of “goodness” deal with moral goodness.
“Good” when used to describe an action’s moral value is being used in Ewing’s ninth sense (DG
116). Ross seems to be in agreement when he identifies actions as the sort of things that can be
intrinsically good (RG 134). He writes at the beginning of his chapter entitled “What Things Are
Good?”, in a similar vein to Ewing,
The first thing for which I would claim that it is intrinsically good is virtuous disposition
and action, i.e. action, or disposition to act, from any one of certain motives, of which at
all events the most notable are the desire to do one’s duty, the desire to bring into being
something that is good, and the desire to give pleasure or save pain to others” (RG 134).
The moral goodness of actions, specifically actions that comprise and perpetuate intimate
relations, will be a central focus of this dissertation. “Good” can also be used to describe a
person’s moral character and this is the usage indicated by Ewing’s tenth sense of “good” (DG
116). Ross too notes this definition of “good” along with its moral connotations (RG 66). The
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moral character of the person will be discussed briefly in chapter six: Aristotle discusses
character as it relates to interpersonal relationships.24
The sixth and seventh definitions of “good” Ewing mentions both relate to intrinsic
goodness. The sixth definition of “good” that he discusses he terms “intrinsic good,” but it is
defined differently by Ewing than it is by Moore since he says this sense of good means “good as
an end” (DG 114). In fact, Ewing’s description of “intrinsic goodness” seems more similar to
what will be termed “final value” later in this chapter as he explicitly sets it up as the opposite of
good as a means (DG 114). Contrary to what will be explored later as Moore’s view of intrinsic
value, Ewing says that intrinsic good does not mean good in all contexts or if everything else in
the universe was different (DG 114). Ross too discusses intrinsic value as the second predicative
type of good, but his definition is much closer to that of Moore (RG 68). Moore’s definition will
be discussed later in this chapter as well.
Ultimate goodness, also a Moorean concept, is that which Ewing describes as the seventh
type of good, and Ross describes this as the third type of predicative good (DG 114-115, RG 6872).25 Both Ewing and Ross explicitly follow Moore’s definition of ultimate good which leads to
their similarities. Ultimately good things are either intrinsically good unities, that is they have no
pieces, or comprised of pieces which are all individually intrinsically good. Things that have
neutral or bad parts, but are still good overall, could be intrinsically good; however, they could
not be ultimately good. The definition of ultimate goodness implies stricter criteria than that of
intrinsic goodness. The applicability of ultimate goodness to intimate relationships may be
interesting but is not argued for by any of the normative theorists discussed in this dissertation.

24
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Moreover, it is unnecessary to the claims of this dissertation that intimate relationships be
ultimately good.
Part II: A Further Explanation of the Relevant Uses of “Good”
Despite the many uses of the word “good,” investigations into the moral value of
relationships focus on four senses of the word: intrinsic goodness, extrinsic goodness,
instrumental goodness, and final goodness. However, even these terms need to be clearly
defined since different philosophers use them differently. The first step in defining them is to
see which account of intrinsic goodness will best serve the purpose of categorizing different
accounts of value without simultaneously judging certain normative theories to be inferior to
others. Once that task is completed extrinsic value can be defined as intrinsic value’s opposite.
Finally, final goodness will be distinguished from intrinsic goodness since it describes a different
theoretically neutral facet of value.
Moore writes that to figure out which things have intrinsic value, in the sense referred to
by Ross, “… it is necessary to consider which things are such that, if they existed in themselves,
in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good …”26 This method of
considering the goodness of something alone and separate from everything else in existence has
become known as the “isolation test” of intrinsic goodness. According to Moore, this test
accomplishes two tasks essential to determining whether something is intrinsically good. First, it
shows that the thing is not merely a means to some other good since, according to the thought
experiment, nothing else exists for the thing in question to effect. Second, it allows one to
accurately compare the relative goodness of one piece of a larger whole to the goodness of that
whole.
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This sense of intrinsic value is unbiased. The fact that object A’s value is independent of
other objects does not affect the value of object A. Object A is not bad, nor less good, if its value
is dependent on object B. Moreover, investigating whether object A’s value is dependent on
other objects or circumstances does not necessarily influence the appraisal of a normative theory
of ethics. One can classify the goodness of the Kantian good will or pleasure as intrinsic or not
without claiming that the good will is better or worse than pleasure or that Kantianism is a more
accurate account of morality.
In his later article entitled “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” Moore explicitly defines
intrinsic value when he writes, “To say that a kind of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the
question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it depends solely on the
intrinsic nature of the thing in question” (CIV 260). Moore then goes on to explain the
implications of this definition. First, he specifies that value of this sort depends on the internal
properties of the object. Thus, the value must be exactly the same at all times under all possible,
rather than merely actual, circumstances (CIV 267). Moore is explicit about this in order to
eliminate the possibility that the examined object’s interaction with actual causal laws results in
the object’s value, making the value reliant on its relationship with causal laws rather than its
intrinsic properties. He goes on to state that numerical difference is not enough to affect intrinsic
value; two objects that are exactly the same, or copies of one another, must also share the same
intrinsic value despite being two separate objects (CIV 262). In other words, the physical
distinctness of two objects cannot make a difference to their intrinsic properties because that
distinctness is a relational feature as opposed to an intrinsic one. Moore is also careful to point
out that two objects do not need to have different qualities for them to have different intrinsic
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values (CIV 264). A difference in the extent of a quality, like fluorescence, could be enough to
change the intrinsic value of a diamond, for example.

According to Moore intrinsic value is something to be gauged in isolation from other
objects in order to confirm its non-relational and non-circumstantial nature. For example, to
decide whether a painting was intrinsically valuable according to Moore one would imagine that
painting as being the only thing that ever existed in the universe. In this case the painting’s value
could not come from any observer, interest in the painting, or the historical context of the
painting’s creation.
Ralf Barton Perry in his General Theory of Value offers a contradictory view to Moore’s
account of intrinsic value by arguing that all value is related to an interest taken in something.
As he writes “Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is
taken in it.”27 On this view all value comes from an object’s relationship to a person’s interest.
For example, an autographed baseball is valuable insomuch as someone has interest in it. This
theory seems opposed to intrinsic value’s existence because it deems all value to be relational.
This is problematic because intrinsic value is supposed to be non-relational by definition.
Nevertheless, Perry maintains that his theory leaves room for intrinsic goodness. Perry writes
that Moore’s isolation test is a serious objection to his own view: “value would shine by a
reflected glory having no original source.”28 He then addresses this problem by appealing to the
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Synthetic judgments of goodness would
require a distinct subject to make them, thereby failing the isolation test. One could judge
synthetically whether the autographed baseball was valuable, and this judgment would require a

27
28

Perry, R. B. 1926. General Theory of Value. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. pgs 115-116.
Ibid. 132.

Page 22

subject to determine whether the baseball was valued. Analytic judgments, on the other hand,
would not necessitate a subject.29 A desired autographed baseball is valuable analytically and
independent of a subject according to Perry.

Ross, however, spends the first half of chapter four in The Right and The Good disputing
Perry’s claim that his theory of value, or others like it, can allow for the existence of intrinsic
value. Ross, as a response to Perry’s claim that all value is related to an interest taken in
something, writes:
If ‘good’, then, be defined as Professor Perry defines it, nothing can be intrinsically good.
And his attempt to get over the difficulty of the apparent necessity (for a relational view
of value) of denying that anything has intrinsic value, by means of the distinction
between analytic and synthetic judgements, comes to nothing. ‘O-desired-by-S’ is not a
different object which can truly be said to possess intrinsic value when it is denied that
any O apart from being desired has intrinsic value. ‘O-desired-by-S is good’ is simply
another way of saying ‘any O has value not in itself but by virtue of the co-existence with
it, and in a certain relation to it, of S’. And to say this is to deny intrinsic value to
anything (RG 77-78).
Thus, Perry’s argument that analytic judgments of value pass Moore’s isolation test and can be
considered intrinsically valuable fails. Perry’s theory of value is incompatible with Moore’s
definition of intrinsic value and would be more accurately understood as a theory about final
value than Moorean intrinsic value.

29
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Feldman discusses Moore’s definition of intrinsic value alongside several others in his
article “Hyperventilating About Intrinsic Value.”30 Feldman first lists eight different ways in
which philosophers have used the phrase ‘intrinsic good.’ Moore’s isolation test and definition
account for two of those eight.

Drawing on Aristotle and Plato, the first meaning of intrinsic good that Feldman
identifies is unimprovable goodness. Something that is an unimprovable good cannot be made
better by the addition of other goods. A painting that is unimprovably good cannot be made
better by adding anything to it. However, Feldman ends up rejecting this meaning of intrinsic
good because it conflicts with a pluralistic account of goodness: a pluralistic account of goodness
will always allow for the addition of a different sort of good to improve overall goodness. 31 To
return to the example of the painting, it might make sense if the only good were beauty. It might
be possible that the painting was unimprovably good in the sense that it was unimprovably
beautiful, and if beauty were the only good then unimprovably beautiful would be identical with
unimprovably good. However, if one allows for other goods like accessibility or a pleasant
smell, then surely the unimprovably beautiful painting can be made better by adding accessibility
and a pleasant smell. The sense of intrinsic goodness identified with unimprovability must be
rejected for the purposes of this dissertation: this sense of intrinsic goodness could only sensibly
apply to non-pluralistic accounts of ethics. As a result only non-pluralistic accounts of ethics
could consider intimate relationships good in this sense. Since this dissertation is examining
pluralistic accounts of ethics using the unimprovability criterion of intrinsic goodness would bias
the results of the analysis against those theories of ethics.
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The second meaning identified by Feldman comes from Aristotle: that intrinsic goodness
is identified with the most final good. Final goodness, however, will be dealt with next as
separate from intrinsic goodness. The purpose in separating intrinsic goodness and final
goodness is that the two terms can be used to identify different features of the same value.
Kant’s use of unqualified goodness is the third definition of intrinsic goodness examined
by Feldman. This definition can be taken literally to mean that intrinsic goodness needs no
qualifier, yet this would be an odd interpretation since “intrinsic” is already a qualifier. On the
other hand, by unqualified goodness Kant might mean incorruptibility which is the seventh
possible meaning for intrinsic goodness identified by Feldman.

The fourth definition of intrinsic goodness is attributed to Brentano. He argues that
intrinsically good things are the correct objects of intrinsic love. To accept this definition one
must first accept Brentano’s theory of psychology and the fittingness of emotions such as love.
Yet to do so would be to accept so many of Brentano’s premises that the application of this
account of intrinsic value to other normative theories would either not make sense or simply
indicate a theory’s agreement or disagreement with Brentano’s. This definition of intrinsic value
has too much theoretical baggage to be used as unbiased criterion by which to measure different
normative theories of ethics.
The fifth and sixth definitions that Feldman examines are Moore’s. Each has already
been discussed.

The seventh, again, is incorruptibility. Feldman attributes this definition to Kant and
Chisholm. The idea is that incorruptible or necessary goods are good regardless of the
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circumstance, and in all possible worlds. This definition is usable because, like Moore’s
definition, it does not change the goodness of an object to describe it as incorruptible. Nor does
identifying a theory’s ability to assign incorruptible goodness to an object make that theory a
more plausible account of ethics.
Finally, Feldman discusses Chisholm’s view that intrinsically good things are those
which ought to exist. Yet, similar to Brentano’s definition, one must accept a particular view of
what ought to exist in order to understand and accept this definition. It would be exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate each of the normative theories discussed in this
dissertation on the basis of this definition since some do not even address whether objects or
events ought to exist. Furthermore, even those theories that do address things that ought to exist
would be judged by Chisholm’s standard if this account of intrinsic value were utilized to
evaluate different moral theories: those theories that agreed the most with Chisholm’s view
would be favored by this account of intrinsic value. However, the point of this dissertation is to
use value classifications in an unbiased analysis of different normative theories. Thus, this
account of intrinsic goodness will not meet the purpose of this dissertation.

Feldman concludes his review of the possible meanings of intrinsic value by claiming
that two of the eight original definitions seem promising, but are incomplete and point in
different directions: Moore’s view that intrinsic goodness is dependent on intrinsic nature and the
view that intrinsic goodness is incorruptible.32 Feldman calls them incomplete because neither
criterion identifies a specifically moral sort of goodness. This sort of incompleteness, however,
is not problematic from the point of view of this dissertation. Whether “intrinsic goodness” can
be applied to non-moral goods such as the validity of an argument is beside the point of figuring
32
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out which of the normative theories that will be examined in this dissertation can be said to
attribute intrinsic goodness to intimate relationships. Furthermore, it is not clear that the two
definitions do point in completely different directions. Reliance on intrinsic nature and
incorruptibility do offer distinct interpretations of intrinsic goodness, but Moore’s careful
definition in “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” reveals some important similarities.
According to Moore, because intrinsic value is determined by a thing’s intrinsic nature it
does not change between possible worlds. Moore even writes “A kind of value is intrinsic if and
only if, when anything possesses it, that same thing or anything exactly like it would necessarily
or must always, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree” (CIV 265). A
thing’s intrinsic nature is independent of how it is utilized by someone or how it interacts with
different causal laws. For example, if a baseball bat is intrinsically good on Moore’s definition it
is also incorruptible. On Moore’s view, the baseball bat’s intrinsic properties, such as the type
and quality of wood it is made from, would be the source of its goodness. The baseball bat’s
intrinsic properties remain unchanged whether in the hands of a sweet-swinging third baseman, a
terrible hitting pitcher, or a murderer; therefore, its intrinsic goodness too would remain
unchanged. Even in the hands of a murder the bat would be considered intrinsically good: since
its intrinsic properties are not changed by the murder it cannot become intrinsically bad or even
intrinsically less good which is why Moore considers intrinsic good incorruptible. Moore’s
definition is stricter than that of incorruptibility and necessity since it may be possible for these
properties not to be based entirely on intrinsic nature. For example, if object A’s incorruptible or
necessary goodness relied on some extrinsic relationship that existed between it and object B in
every possible world and every possible circumstance, then object A would still not be
intrinsically good: its goodness would rely on something other than its internal properties even
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though that something (object B) existed in every possible world and circumstance. However,
any intrinsically good object must also be incorruptible and necessarily good; since object A’s
goodness is not reliant on anything in the world it will be good regardless of the possible world
or circumstance into which it is placed.
Intrinsic value’s opposite, extrinsic value, is marked by its relational and/or
circumstantial nature. Relational aspects of an object’s value include the relationships between
an object and a larger whole, to a causal chain, or to an observer. An example of relational value
is the value of speed in a baseball player. Speed alone is worth very little in a baseball player
because without any other skills that baseball player cannot help his team win. However, the
value of speed in a baseball player increases dramatically when coupled with other skills such as
the ability to consistently make solid contact with pitches or fielding prowess. Circumstantial
aspects of an object’s value are often related the object’s particular history. For example, the
value of a sacrifice bunt in a particular baseball game is largely determined by the plays that
precede and succeed it. The important feature of extrinsic value is its reliance on features
outside the object rather than internal ones. Extrinsic value, like intrinsic value, is also theory
neutral. Classifying a value as extrinsic does not necessarily bear on the positive or negative
nature of that value; in other words, objects may be extrinsically good or bad. Simply
identifying that the location of an object’s value as outside the object or related to some other
object does not change the value of the object either.
Korsgaard, in “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” argues that intrinsic goodness and final
goodness are importantly different. According to Korsgaard the two concepts answer different
questions. Intrinsic goodness describes “… the location or source of goodness rather than the
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way we value the thing.”33 Final goodness, on the other hand, is a concept that identifies how we
value something: as something good for its own sake rather than the sake of its consequences.
To claim that something has final goodness is to value it for what it is rather than for that to
which it may lead. Intrinsic goodness is sometimes posed as the opposite of instrumental
goodness, but this conflates questions about the source of a thing’s goodness with questions
about how a thing is valued. One need only reflect back on Moore’s definition of intrinsic
goodness to clarify this distinction. An object is intrinsically good because of its internal
features, or intrinsic properties. Its goodness comes from itself. Conversely, for Moore the
question of an object’s intrinsic goodness has nothing to do with how someone treats the object.
Whether a person treats an object as a means or an end has no bearing on that thing’s intrinsic
goodness on Moore’s view. On the other hand, whether an object is treated as a means or an end
does determine whether that object can be considered to be a final good. Korsgaard admits that
it is possible for intrinsic value and instrumental value to be opposites, but only under the
influence of a specific normative or metaphysical theory. One could claim that all intrinsically
good things should be valued as ends or final goods, but this would require either a large
normative assumption or significant argument. Korsgaard explains some of the impossibilities
that result from ignoring the distinction between intrinsic and final goods. If all final goods were
intrinsically valuable, then no object with a value dependent on relational properties could be
valuable as more than a means to some other end. However, certain objects are valuable as ends
despite that value relying on relational or circumstantial features. For example, the famous T206 Honus Wagner baseball card’s incredible value comes from its rarity, a clearly relational
property. Yet, someone who purchases the card could value its rarity for its own sake rather than
as a means to pleasure or future financial gain. The card would then have final value but lack
33
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intrinsic value. Therefore, final goodness and intrinsic goodness must be separable. Their
opposites, instrumental and extrinsic goodness respectively, are also separable.

Like intrinsic and extrinsic value, final value and instrumental value are theory neutral.
The terms “final value” and “instrumental value” are merely tools for classifying how a good is
valued: as an ends or a means. Defining a particular good as instrumentally valuable does not
change its value. Additionally, classifying the goods identified by a particular normative theory
as instrumental or final does not make a theory more or less plausible as such.

C.I. Lewis provides an example of extrinsic value that is not merely a means to some
other end when he describes contributive value. According to Lewis, experiences have
contributory value if they modify the felt value in another experience rather than merely causing
the felt value. The felt value is the value recognized by the person experiencing the value.34 The
modification can be either unidirectional or bidirectional and can directly affect final value.
Lewis provides the example of a boy working for the price of a circus ticket. The work is not
merely instrumentally valuable if the boy’s enjoyment of the circus is increased by having earned
the enjoyment through his own work.35 If the good of working was merely instrumental, then the
boy would get x amount of pleasure from the circus whether he earned the ticket or got it for
free. However, in Lewis’ example the boy gets x+y pleasure from attending the circus after
earning the ticket: the extra pleasure denoted by y marks the good that was contributed by the
work to the boy’s overall experience of pleasure. Thus, the work is not an end in itself. Nor is it
merely a means to the pleasure he gets from only experiencing the circus. The work, by
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changing the experience of the circus for the boy, is neither instrumentally nor finally valuable: it
has contributory value.

Final goodness is correctly contrasted with instrumental goodness. Objects that are
instrumentally good are not valued for their own sakes but as stepping stones to some other
goods, or means to some other ends. For example, the goodness of cash is instrumental in most
cases. Cash is usually valued for its ability to get something else: either another instrumental
good or a final good. All instrumental goods must eventually lead to some final good which is
valued for its own sake. One might use instrumentally good cash to purchase a baseball cap that
one considers to be valuable as an end, as a souvenir. Alternately, the cap may be instrumentally
valuable in keeping one’s head warm and providing a more pleasant experience during a windy
game (the pleasant experience being the final good in this case). The monetary value of the cap
may be the same, but its value to the purchaser in each case is different. As a souvenir the cap is
treated as good for simply being what it is: a cap bought at a baseball game. As something that
will keep one’s head warm the cap is only valuable insofar as it leads to the final end of a more
pleasurable experience of the game.

This dissertation will utilize the four types of goodness just discussed to evaluate each
normative theory’s treatment of intimate relationships in chapters four through seven. The
importance of whether intimate relationships are intrinsically, extrinsically, instrumentally, or
finally valuable will be examined in chapter three. These four terms, as they have just been
defined, are especially useful in comparing values of different moral theories because they do
not, in and of themselves, have normative significance. This allows one to apply them to a
theory without altering or prejudging the theory. Chisholm and Brentano’s accounts of intrinsic
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goodness were rejected precisely because they did not share this characteristic. Their views of
goodness are not normatively neutral. The only ways to apply them to Aristotle’s view of
interpersonal relationships’ value would be either to judge Aristotle’s view as incorrect or to alter
Aristotle’s view of interpersonal relationships to fit the general view of value. This is not the
case with Moore’s view of intrinsic goodness. Interpersonal relationships are either intrinsically
good or not according to Moore’s definition of intrinsic goodness. One need not make a further
normative judgment about the importance of intrinsic goodness to an accurate account of
morality in general or interpersonal relationships in particular.36 The same is true of extrinsic,
instrumental, and final goods.

36
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Chapter 3: Intimate Relationships
Part I: Definition
There are many different types of interpersonal relationship and each might be valuable
in some respect. Yet, to examine the value of every type of interpersonal relationship on each
type of normative theory would be too large a project. Instead, the scope of relationships
examined in this dissertation will be limited to the set of relationships I define below as intimate
relationships: relationships between individuals that are supposed to be significantly closer than
acquaintances but not restricted to only the closest of friends. The purpose of this definition is to
separate out the sorts of relationships that are endorsed by Immanuel Kant, G.E. Moore,
Aristotle, and Virginia Held in the subsequent chapters. The resulting definition points to those
relationships most likely to be considered morally valuable without leaving out morally
significant relationships that do not fall under the standard definitions of friendship.
Intimate relationships37 are those in which the involved individuals love, wish each other
well, and act for each other as ends in themselves. Loving, wishing well, and acting for one
another as ends are often discussed as necessary conditions of friendship; however, here the
conditions of loving, wishing, and acting for one other as ends will be both necessary and
sufficient for an interpersonal relationship’s description as intimate. This is dissimilar to
discussions of friendship which commonly add other requirements to the list of sufficient
conditions such as: equality between the relations and choice in the creation of the relationship.
Loving, wishing, and acting for each member of the relationship for her own sake are the
distinguishing marks of an intimate relationship; they have also been seen as necessary
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conditions for the best sort of friendship. The idea of loving, wishing another well, and acting
for another as an end in herself can be broken down into six component pieces, each of which is
important to close relationships: loving another, wishing another well, acting for the other
person, doing so in a way that regards the other person as an end in herself, doing so mutually or
for one another, and trusting that the other loves and wishes one well as an end in herself.
To love another, in terms of intimate relationships, means to have strong positive
emotions toward the other person that give rise to pleasure when in the presence of the other
person.38 Additionally, the positive emotions and the pleasure one experiences when in the
presence of the other person are stronger than those experienced in the presence of someone that
is liked rather than loved. Aristotle points out that, while not merely for the sake of pleasure, the
best kind of friendship is certainly pleasant.39 Elizabeth Telfer explains the positive feelings
friends experience in one another’s presence as part of the “passions” of friendship. She writes
that there is a desire to be with one’s friends and that this desire gives rise to pleasure when one
spends time with one’s friends.40 Neera Badhwar, in examining the question of love, writes:
“This exclusion of pleasure from the phenomenon of love is, however, false to experience… one
cannot love a person without delighting in her under some aspect…”41 David Annis too identifies
the liking of one’s friend with the enjoyment of her company and makes both necessary pieces of
friendship.42,43
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Wishing the other person in the relationship well is the second component of friendships
that is also an important part of intimate relationships. To wish another well simply means to
want good things for that person. Wishing another well can mean, among other things, wishing
for the other’s happiness, health, and/or success. Aristotle writes in the Rhetoric “We may
describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things,
not for your own sake but for his… A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in
return…”44 Telfer claims that affection is a necessary condition of friendship and writes “I
define 'affection' as a desire for another's welfare and happiness as a particular individual.”45
Badhwar echoes the same sentiment when she writes “The best, most complete friendships are
those in which friends love and wish each other well as ends in themselves…”46 The desire for
the other person’s good is seen as distinct from, but complimentary to, the pleasure one gets from
the other’s company.
Wishing another well as an end in herself is not enough without taking action for the
other person’s sake. Reciprocal goodwill is an important part of intimate relations, but when it
consistently fails to result in any action there is reason to doubt that the relationship is an
intimate one. Annis, in discussing friendship, writes
It isn't merely that it is nice for friends to help, to provide psychological support, but that
we expect friends to act this way, are surprised if they don't, and frequently feel betrayed
and not just harmed if they intentionally let us down… Not helping seems inconsistent
with the friendship, and if it happens often, the friendship has been abandoned.47
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Telfer agrees and lists several tangible examples of things friends are expected to do for one
another: “… to help the friend when under attack (physical or verbal) or in need or trouble of any
kind; to proffer advice and criticism, not only when asked for but also when not asked for but
needed.”48 Intimate relationships also require that wishing the other well translates into acting
for the other in some cases. The form such action must take, however, will vary greatly
depending on the individuals involved in the relationships and their abilities.49 One’s actions for
the other may be outstripped by one’s wishes for the other. This point becomes important when
considering whether relationships between two individuals with different abilities can be
considered intimate.50
The third component of close relationships is that the other is loved, wished well, and
acted for as an end in herself. This is a vital component of intimate relationships like close
friendships because it differentiates them from less personal relationships. The condition of
loving, wishing, and acting for another as an end in herself, in the context of intimate
relationships, means two things: treating the other as a goal rather than a means to some other
good and treating the other as a particular individual rather than an abstract representation.
As Aristotle makes clear in Nicomachean Ethics, relationships in which friends
participate in order to gain some utility or pleasure are not of the highest sort.51 Neither the
relationship itself nor the other person is the targeted value in relationships where the others are
not loved or wished well as ends in themselves; instead, there is some other value aimed at by
continuing the relationship. Furthermore, in these relationships the other person is a means to
utility and/or pleasure and might be replaced with a more efficient means or when the use and/or
48
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pleasure is no longer obtained from that person. As Badhwar writes, “A friend who is loved as
an end is numerically irreplaceable in the sense that she is not a means to a happiness which can
be better or as well served by another”52 Annis adds that “At least part of the concern in
friendship must be altruistic, that is a concern for our friend’s welfare for the sake of the
friend.”53 Therefore, loving, wishing, and acting for another as an end in herself are indicative of
the irreplaceability of the other in the relationship, one person valuing the other and/or
relationship directly, and one person making the other the object of concern in the relationship.
Badhwar and Telfer both argue that treating a friend as an end in herself also necessitates
recognizing that friend’s particular nature. Badhwar’s article, “Friends as Ends in Themselves,”
is devoted to explaining the difference between means love and ends love in friendships and
concludes that loving someone as an end in herself means loving the “unique and irreplaceable”
in that person.54 Badhwar arrives at this conclusion by comparing the love that exists in
friendship to unconditional or blind love.55 She argues that the love involved in friendships is a
response to the friend’s particular qualities and the sort of love that is bestowed without regard to
such qualities cannot be the foundation of friendship.56 In comparing particular types of
unconditional and instrumental love Badhwar writes “Their difference is only that in one the
individual target is regarded as an end, in the other, as a means. But in neither is the individual
loved for the unique character or personality that makes him the distinct person he is, as he must
be in the end love of friendship.”57 Telfer notes that the desire for another’s good in friendship is
“… to be distinguished both from sense of duty and from benevolence. For these motives
52
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prompt us to seek others' good in general, whereas we want to say that those who feel affection
feel a concern for another which they do not feel for everyone.”58 Both argue, in effect, that the
other person in a friendship must be loved for who she is as an individual as opposed to being
loved for her human dignity, autonomous nature, or some other generally shared quality. As
mentioned previously, for two people to be close friends there must be positive feelings toward
each other that give rise to pleasure when in each other’s company. If the pleasure they take in
each other’s presence is not significantly different than the pleasure taken in a stranger’s
presence, then love fails to differentiate between friends and strangers. Yet, this is empirically
false because the pleasure and positive emotions felt for a friend are different than those felt for
a stranger; in fact, this is part of what differentiates a friend from a stranger.
Mutuality is the fourth component of intimate relationships. For two people to be
intimate relations both must love, wish the other well, and act for the other as an end in herself.
Intimate relationships cannot be unidirectional. Aristotle writes “But to those who thus wish
good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal
being friendship.”59 The love, wishes, and actions must be granted to each member of the
relationship for it to count as intimate rather than some other type of relationship.
In discussions of friendships the requirement of equality is sometimes added to the
criterion of mutuality. For example, Badhwar writes “I define friendship as a practical and
emotional relationship of mutual and equal goodwill, affection and pleasure”60 Laurence Thomas
argues that deep friendships are marked by the absence of authority of one friend over another.61
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However, other writers do not see equality as a necessary component of friendships. Aristotle
writes:
In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better
should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each
of the other cases; for when the love is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then in a
sense arises equality, which is certainly help to be a characteristic of friendship.62
Equality here might mean a couple of different things. It might mean that the people involved in
the relationship are moral equals or of equal moral worth; however, Badhwar, Thomas, and
Aristotle seem to mean something quite different. 63 Rather than discussing whether friends
must be moral equals, Badhwar asserts that friends must reciprocate equally at least on an
emotional level. Thomas is primarily concerned about two friends being on equal authoritative
footing over one another. Even Aristotle discusses the possibility of two socially unequal people
being friends. Yet, two people do not need to be equal in any of these ways to love, wish the
other well, and act for the other as an end in herself. Furthermore, the love, wishes, and actions
that each member of the relationship undertakes for the other’s sake may be uneven in intimate
relations. For example, the number and complexity of the actions that a parent performs for a
child may be far greater than those that a child performs for a parent. As long as the child acts
for her parent for the parent’s own sake as an end, that child would still meet the mutuality
criterion of intimate relationships (in terms of acting). In light of these points and the fact that
the term ‘intimate relationships’ is intended to describe a wider range of relationships than just
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the deepest friendships, there is no need for intimate relationships to meet such equality criteria
as those discussed by Badhwar, Thomas, and Aristotle.64
The final component of intimate relationships is trust that the other will love, wish one
well, and act for the other as an end in herself. Annis and Thomas both identify trust as central
to close friendships.65,66 Thomas, for example, includes “an enormous bond of mutual trust” as
one of the three defining features of companion friendships.67 Annette Baier’s article “Trust and
Antitrust” delves into the variety and significance of trust in interpersonal relationships.68 She
provides the following definition of trust: “Trust, on the analysis I have proposed, is letting other
persons (natural or artificial, such as firms, nations, etc.) take care of something the truster cares
about, where such "caring for" involves some exercise of discretionary powers.”69 In the case of
intimate relationships the something being cared for is the other person and the care being
offered takes the form of loving, wishing well, and acting for the other’s sake. Baier also
explores the psychological aspect of trust indicating that it may be unconscious, conscious but
unchosen, or consciously cultivated.70 This is important to the definition of intimate
relationships because it allows children and mentally disabled people who may not understand
the concept of trust to participate in intimate relationships despite an inability to consciously
chose or cultivate trust.71
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Additionally, it also opens up the possibility that trust need not be acknowledged in a
relationship.72 For example, Steve and Jared may reveal what they consider secrets to one
another in conversation without explicitly asking one another to keep the conversations private.
Instead, they may unconsciously rely on one another’s discretion and well wishing to prevent
their words from being repeated to other people. As Baier writes, proper trust must be able to
survive its revelation but need not actually be revealed.73 Baier is also careful to point out that
trust is not always morally good and sets out to distinguish morally good trust from morally
problematic trust. She concludes
A trust relationship is morally bad to the extent that either party relies on qualities in the
other which would be weakened by the knowledge that the other relies on them. Where
each relies on the other's love, or concern for some common good, or professional pride
in competent discharge of responsibility, knowledge of what the other is relying on in one
need not undermine but will more likely strengthen those relied-on features.74
Since intimate relationships are marked by each person relying on the other’s loving, wishing,
and acting, they exhibit a morally positive form of trust.
One criterion sometimes identified with close friendships that is not a component of
intimate relationships is choice in the formation of the relationship. Telfer and Thomas, for
example, both discuss choice as being an important part of deep friendships and contrast
friendships with the parent-child relationship.75 Yet, including choice as a criterion of intimate
relationships is problematic for two reasons: it is unclear what level of choice is required of
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friendships and there is no need to restrict intimate relationships to those that are freely
undertaken. Despite the fact that Telfer and Thomas include choice as one of the components of
friendships, they both admit that the choice to become friends is partial at best. Telfer includes
involuntary passions as part of her account of friendship and must therefore admit that choice’s
involvement in friendship is limited. She writes “In this way my two necessary conditions are
compatible with, and themselves imply, choice in friendship-though they also imply that we
cannot choose to be a friend of just anyone, since the relevant passions cannot be summoned up
at will.”76 Thomas concedes: “Yet, it is all too obvious that as a rule we do not self-consciously
choose our friends in the way that we choose, say, the clothes that we wear.”77 Even if choice is
a vital part of friendships, it is not a necessary part of the definition of the intimate relationships
that this dissertation will examine. Whether choice is a significant part of a relationship may be
philosophically interesting and consequential, but it does not necessarily bear on the moral value
of the relationship itself.
Part II: Application of the Definition
The definition of intimate relationships can be applied in order to see which sorts of
relationships can and cannot meet the aforementioned criteria. Deep friendships such as those
described by Aristotle, Badhwar, Telfer, Annis, and Thomas would be one subcategory of
intimate relationships. Relationships that are sometimes seen as more distant, such as those
between playmates or sports teammates, might also count as intimate relationships: so long as
the concern of each member of the relationship for the other extended beyond their roles in the
mutual interest. Many parent-child relationships could also count as long as the child was able to
appreciate her parent as an end in herself. Married couples, whether the result of arranged or
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freely chosen marriage, could be intimate relations. Even a romantic couple in which one or
both members are cheating on their significant others could be in an intimate relationship with
one another if both members of the couple could meet the aforementioned criterion of trust in
addition to all the other criteria. A mentally disabled person and her unrelated caretaker might
be intimate relations too as long as the mentally disabled person possessed the mental faculties to
understand her caretaker as an end in herself.
Other relationships could not count as intimate ones. For example, the relationship
between two strangers would not meet the requirement of loving the other as an end in herself
even if they both bore general goodwill to everyone. Siblings whose competitiveness prevented
them from sincerely wishing each other well as ends in themselves could not be intimate
relations. Two sports stars who mutually admired and even loved one another but never realized
that admiration or love by acting for each other’s good would not be intimate relations. A
newborn baby cannot be a part of an intimate relationship because she cannot recognize another
person as an end in herself. Someone who loves, wishes well, and acts for another as an end in
herself but whose love, wishes, and acts are not returned by the other is not in an intimate
relationship.
Intimate relationships are similar to close friendships because close friendships are one
form of intimate relationship. Thus, the two share the criteria of loving, wishing the other well,
and acting for the other as an end in herself. Each of the criteria is performed mutually and with
trust in both intimate relationships and close friendships. This is a good sign since Kant, Moore,
and Aristotle directly discuss friendships. However, intimate relationships include other
relationships too. By excluding the criteria of equality in the relationship and choice in the
formation of the relationship from the definition of intimate relationships, the term “intimate
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relationship” is able to include close relationships, like familial ones, that the term “friendship”
cannot. This too is important for the purposes of this dissertation since Aristotle and Held
discuss relationships that do not fit into the category of friendship.
The added benefit of including close friendships, close familial relationships, and
romantic relationships under one more general heading is that these are the three categories of
relationship most often attributed value by actual people in the world. These are the relationships
that almost everyone has, that authors have written about for millennia, and that are prime
candidates for moral value. If any category of relationship has moral value it is one or more of
these three. Other relationships may have moral value too, but what seems incredibly unlikely
and contrary to human experience is that some other category of relationship that does not fall
under the definition explained above has moral value while those relationships defined above as
intimate do not. That is the risk of restricting the discussion about the moral value of
interpersonal relationships to only friendships, only familial relationships, or only romantic
relationships: that one ends up examining the moral value of a sort of relationship that does not
have moral value while some other category of relationship does have moral value. By using a
broader definition than that of friendship while retaining a majority of the features of friendship
that have made it philosophically interesting I hope to mitigate that risk.
Intimate relationships, then, are the relevant set of emotions, desires, and actions of two
people that meet the aforementioned requirements for some length of time.78 An intimate
relationship exists between the time that each member develops the relevant emotions and
78
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desires and at least one member loses them.79 The time it takes for the psychological
development and fading of these emotions and desires in actual people acts as a natural
constraint on the length of intimate relationships.80 For example, loving someone else as an end
in herself requires knowledge of that person and love in the face of such knowledge. Yet, both
the development of love and learning enough about another person to appreciate her as an end in
herself take time. Even if love for another were to appear before one had sufficient knowledge
of another person as an end in herself, that love would not be enough to qualify the relationship
as intimate until it survived the acquisition of the relevant knowledge. Intimate relationships can
end more quickly than they begin, as the trust required of intimate relations can sometimes be
lost in a moment. However, in many cases trust, loving another as an end in herself, and wishing
another well as an end in herself persist for a significant amount of time even if there is little to
no contact between the individuals involved in the relationship. Thus, intimate relationships take
a significant amount of time to form but once formed their length is more often measured in
years than days.
Part III: Intimate Relationships and Value
Intimate relationships and various types of value have been clearly defined, so the
intersection of intimate relationships and value now bears examination. The two questions about
value that Korsgaard identifies in “Two Distinctions in Goodness” can be applied to intimate
relationships: what is the location of an intimate relationship’s goodness and how does one value
an intimate relationship.81 An intimate relationship may be good in-itself or its goodness might
be related to something other than the relationship itself. In neither case does the account of the
79
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value’s location conflict with the idea of an intimate relationship. However, the way in which
one values a relationship does determine whether that relationship can be considered an intimate
one. One who values one’s relationship with another person as merely instrumentally good
cannot, by definition, be involved in an intimate relationship with that other person.82 Only
relationships that are valued as final goods are viable candidates for intimate relationships. The
subjectivity or objectivity of intimate relationships’ value also warrants discussion due to the
partiality that such relationships require of their participants.
Intimate relationships can be described as having either intrinsic or extrinsic value.
Intimate relationships have intrinsic value if their value comes from their intrinsic nature.
Perhaps the simplest way to intuitively gauge whether intimate relationships have intrinsic value
is to subject them to Moore’s isolation test: is the existence of an intimate relationship, in
absolute isolation from everything besides the people involved, judged to be good?83 Moore
supposes that an affirmative answer to this question would indicate that the goodness of intimate
relationships must depend, at least in part, on their intrinsic properties since only these properties
would exist in such simple universes. On the other hand, negative answers to these questions
would indicate that the goodness of intimate relationships is merely extrinsic: that it must depend
on the association of the intimate relationship with other objects rather than the relationship’s
internal features. Each of the theorists discussed in the subsequent chapters will offer an account
of intimate relationships’ value that can be classified as at intrinsic or extrinsic.
The differences between the theorists’ stances on the intrinsic or extrinsic nature of
intimate relationships’ value does not impact an agent’s ability to foster such relationships.
82
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Many of the philosophers that define and discuss the connection between friendships and value
describe friendships as intrinsically valuable, yet intrinsic value is neither necessary nor
sufficient for a relationship to be described as intimate. Relationships that pass Moore’s test are
intrinsically valuable but may still fail to be the final ends of those people involved in the
relationships. Thus, they would be unable to meet the defining criteria of intimate relationships.
For example, Steve and Leonard might love, wish, and act for one another as means to some
other end, such as their own increased pleasure when watching Mets games. Even if such a
relationship could be considered intrinsically valuable, it still could not be considered intimate
because it is treated by Steve and Leonard as instrumentally good rather than as an end in itself.
Conversely, a relationship that is extrinsically good could still be considered intimate. The
goodness of a particular relationship in which each of the people involved loved, wished, and
acted for the other as an end might depend on circumstantial features of the relationship, yet this
would not prevent the relationship from meeting the requirements of an intimate relationship.
For example, even if the relationship between John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor was only good
because it existed at that particular time in history and would have been bad had it existed in any
other time period, the relationship could be considered an intimate one: as long as they loved,
wished, and acted for one another as ends in themselves the relationship would still meet the
relevant criteria.
Conversely, how a relationship is valued does directly affect whether that relationship
can be considered intimate. Final goods are valued for their own sakes, as ends in themselves,
rather than as means to some other goods. A theory that does not allow for the possibility of
relationships having final value cannot address the value of intimate relationships. In order for
two people to be intimate relations, they must love, wish each other well, and act for each other
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as ends in themselves. Thus, two people involved in a close interpersonal relationship must
value one another as final goods for that relationship to meet the definition of an intimate
relationship.84 The alternatives, not valuing one another at all or valuing one another only as
instrumental goods, are psychologically incompatible with the existence of an intimate
relationship. One simply cannot feel strong positive emotions toward a person for his own sake
without valuing that person. Furthermore, strong positive emotions for a person as an end in
himself are indicative of the value placed on that person as a final good. Similarly, to love a
person for himself is to value him as more than a means to some other end. If Steve values his
close friend Shivang merely as a way to further enjoy his trips to New York City, then Steve
cannot be said to love Shivang for himself.85 There is an undeniable connection, then, between
loving a person for himself and valuing that person as an end in himself: one must value a person
as an end in himself, as a final good, in order for one to be able to love a person as an end in
herself.86
Badhwar in “Friends As Ends In Themselves” discusses a counterargument to the
preceding claims: the possibility that the pleasure that comes from loving someone makes all
love instrumental. It seems undeniable that the experience of love comes with some amount of
pleasure. If this pleasure is the actual goal of love then it would be impossible to love anyone as
an end in herself. In this case, all lovers would be treating their loved ones as an instrumental
means to the end of pleasure that comes from love. This would then make it impossible for any
relationship to meet the criteria of an intimate relationship. Badhwar compares this argument to
that of psychological egoists who would claim that everything is done for self-interested reasons.
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Bishop Joseph Butler’s counter to the psychological egoist would also seem applicable in
this situation: one cannot get pleasure from loving someone unless that person is genuinely the
goal of the love.87 Despite her agreement with Butler’s argument, Badhwar pursues the issue
further in order to see whether love is ultimately a means to the final good of happiness.88 She
formulates two arguments against the claim that love must be instrumental. First, she compares
love to the instrumental good of seeing green valleys.89 She notes that the desire to obtain the
instrumental good of seeing green valleys ends once the final good of happiness is attained. Yet,
this is not the case with love. Love does not end after one is made happy. In fact, it is often
augmented. The desire to see a green valley and the happiness that comes from the fulfillment of
that desire can exist separately. However, this is not the case with happiness and love. Badhwar
writes,
Happiness is related to end love not as a goals to a means, but rather, as an element to a
complex whole. So when x is loved as an end, the happiness cannot, logically, exist apart
from the love: different end loves bring different forms of happiness. By contrast, when
x is loved as a means, the happiness is a further goal of love, and can, logically, exist
without it: different means loves can bring the same form of happiness.90
Love and the pleasure and happiness that result from it are too closely bound to be separated into
a traditional means-ends relationship.
Another question about intimate relationships is whether their value can be objective
despite the subjectivity entailed by their defining criteria. Two constituent features of intimate
relationships are the emotions and desires of the individuals involved. The relevant emotions
87
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and desires are subjective, existing only in the minds of particular subjects, yet subjective
psychological states may still be objectively valuable. In other words, the value of the relevant
psychological states may be a real part of the world separate from any other psychological states
of the two subjects involved in the relationship and separate from the psychological states of any
other subject. If value supervened on psychological states, then some of these subjective states
would be objectively valuable. Thus, it is at least possible that subjective psychological states
such as emotions and desires can be the bearers of objective value and there is no inherent
conflict between the subjectivity of the psychological states necessary for intimate relationships’
existence and the objectivity of their value.
Intimate relationships are interpersonal relationships in which those people involved love
one another, wish one another well, act for one another, do so in a way that regards one another
as an end in herself, do so mutually or for one another, and trust that the other loves and wishes
one well as an end in herself. These relationships may have intrinsic or extrinsic value, but that
value must be a final value as opposed to an instrumental value. The love for the other as an end
in herself that is, by definition, a necessary component of intimate relationships is incompatible
with valuing the relationship only as a means to some other end. Furthermore, because the
pleasure that results from an intimate relationship is inseparable from the relationship and does
not end when either party is happy, intimate relationships are not all instrumental to the
production of pleasure or happiness. Finally, the subjectivity of the psychological states that
help make up intimate relationships does not imply that the value of those relationships is also
subjective.
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Chapter 4: Kant and the Value of Intimate Relationships
Despite many criticisms that Kantian theory is inimical to the development and
maintenance of intimate relationships, Kant did write about such relationships and consider them
valuable. Part one of this chapter will argue that Kant’s discussion of friendships treats them as
extrinsic, final goods. In part two of this chapter, Kantian friendships will be shown to be a
subset of intimate relationships: they share all the defining characteristics of intimate
relationships but add additional requirements that the relationships must meet to be considered
Kantian friendships. Part three will consider the criticisms of Bernard Williams, Michael
Stocker, and Laurence Blum who all claim that Kant’s theory is problematic because of its
treatment of intimate relationships. Part four will evaluate Barbara Herman’s replies to these
criticisms.91 Finally, part five of this chapter will explain why, despite Herman’s attempts,
Kantianism still fails to account for the value of intimate relationships. It will also pinpoint the
theoretical components of Kantianism from which the failure stems.
Part I: Value in Kantian Friendships
Kant is clear in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, hereafter FM, that the
good will is the only unqualifiedly good thing when he writes “Nothing in the world – indeed
nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without
qualification except a good will.”92 Despite this clarity two pertinent questions about the
goodness of the good will are: what sort of value does Kant attribute to it and how does that
value intersect with the value of actions.
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Unqualified goodness is, for Kant, both an intrinsic and final value. Fred Feldman argues
that unqualified goodness, charitably conceived, means incorruptibly good. He writes, “When a
thing is [incorruptibly] good, it has a sort of goodness that things have of necessity. It continues
to have just as much of this goodness in all possible worlds and in all possible circumstances.”93
All other characteristics or objects, such as intelligence or money, are only good in certain
conditions and therefore their value is corruptible. For example, intelligence and money are
good when possessed by a moral exemplar but can be quite bad in the hands of a vicious person.
Conversely, the goodness of the Kantian good will is not changed by any circumstance or
different in any possible world. Kant’s claim that the good will is unqualifiedly good, then,
amounts to a claim that the good will is intrinsically good in Moore’s sense. As discussed in
chapter two, something that has unqualified goodness also meets one of the conditions for
intrinsic goodness: that the value remains the same under all possible circumstances.94 The value
of the good will is positive and uninfluenced by anything external to it; in other words, its
goodness is not located outside itself but is internal and therefore intrinsic in Moore’s sense. For
Kant, the value of the good will is also a final value. He writes “The good will is not good
because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed
end; it is good only because of its willing, i.e., it is good of itself” (FM 10). Kant here explains
how the good will is valuable specifically pointing out that it is not instrumentally good but good
as an end in itself, as a final value.
Though the good will is the only thing with unqualified goodness, actions that derive
from the motive of duty also have moral worth:
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[Thus the first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done
from duty.] The second proposition is: An action performed from duty does not have its
moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the maxim by which
it is determined. Its moral value, therefore, does not depend on the realization of the
object of the action but merely on the principle of volition by which the action is done,
without any regard to the objects of the faculty of desire (FM 16).
The same question asked about the value of the good will can be asked of morally worthy
actions: what type of value do they possess? According to Keith Simmons actions with moral
worth are manifestations of the good will.95 Barbara Herman argues in The Practice of Moral
Judgment, hereafter PMJ, that “The point of saying that it is actions that are credited with moral
worth is to highlight the relationship between an action and its motive (via the action’s maxim),
which is where moral worth resides…”96 Both Simmons and Herman locate the worth of the
action outside the action itself; therefore, the moral goodness of actions is extrinsic. The second
question about the value of morally good actions is how they are valuable: as means or ends. As
evidenced by the previous quotation from FM the value of actions is final since an action’s
goodness exists regardless of its outcome. Thus, the action is not merely valuable because it
leads to some morally valuable consequence. Additionally, the action is not valuable because it
makes the will good or better. Herman writes of Kantian theory
The number of morally worthy acts performed, however, is not proportional to the will’s
goodness… Moral worth is an expression of good will in our actions. It is not a
quantitative measure of good will… as A is prepared to act beneficently, he has a good
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will. It will not be improved if he acts, nor will it be diminished if… he refrains from
action” (PMJ 35).
The good will does make the action coming from it good, but the implication is only
unidirectional. The goodness of an action is not a means to some other end, but an end in itself.
As a result, actions that constitute intimate relationships can have final extrinsic value.
Kant discusses friendship most extensively in two of his works: The Metaphysics of
Morals, afterwards abbreviated MM, and the Lectures on Ethics, hereafter LE.97 In MM Kant
writes that “striving for friendship… is a duty set by reason, and no ordinary duty but an
honorable one” (MM 261). Lara Denis expands on Kant’s point and argues that “Kant praises
friendship because he understands it as a relationship that embodies love and respect for others,
preserves self-respect, and fosters self-development.”98 In LE Kant claims that there are two
motives to action for humans, self love and love of humanity (LE 200). It is the second of these
that Kant identifies as the moral motive and then associates with friendship (LE 202). Stijn Van
Impe writes that the idea of friendship according to Kant is “‘true’ and ‘necessary’, not from the
natural point of view of what we will do, but from the moral point of view of what we ought to
do.”99 Thus, Kant sees friendships as morally valuable relationships. Since friendship is a duty
set by reason, actions that initiate or perpetuate a Kantian friendship can be seen as extrinsically
good, final ends.
Part II: Kantian Friendships as Intimate Relationships
Kantian friendships, however, may or may not meet the criteria of intimate relationships.
Kant actually notes that there are several types of friendship in both MM and LE, but attributes
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the previously discussed moral goodness to what he terms moral friendships (LE 203 and MM
263). An examination of moral friendships shows that they are a subset of intimate relationships
since they involve love between those in the relationship, wishes and actions for the other’s
good, the treatment of the other person as an end in herself, mutuality, and trust.
Kant describes the sentiments involved in friendships in the Vigilantius notes of the
Lectures on Ethics, hereafter referred to as V. 100 He speaks of the “sweet delight in the
enjoyment of friendship.” He also discusses the importance of well-liking and well-wishing as
separable components of friendship (V 407). He says “well-liking can never be wrung from us,
by inclination, without an occasion; so it can never be commanded as a duty” (V 408). Together
these points show that according to Kant friends do feel pleasure when together and, therefore,
satisfy the criterion of love for the other person that is a component of intimate relationships.
Kant also writes that in the closest form of friendship friends wish and act for one
another’s benefit:
How one wishes for a friend in need (one who is, of course, an active friend, ready to
help at his own expense)… friendship cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage but
must rather be a purely moral one, and the help that each may count on from the other in
case of need must not be regarded as the end and determining ground of friendship – for
in that case one would lose the other’s respect – but only as the outward manifestation of
an inner heartfelt benevolence…”(MM 262).
Kant here details a relationship that clearly addresses wishing and doing good for the other and
references several additional criteria of intimate relationships. For example, this quotation refers
to the way in which friends act for one another as ends in themselves. This account also
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discusses the reciprocal nature of friendship. Kant expands on this component of friendship
when he writes,
Well-wishing towards others is, however, more closely and strictly coupled with the idea
of friendship, if the criterion of reciprocal well-wishing is attached to it; for in sensu lato,
the expression to have true friendship for another is not necessarily associated with the
idea that this other is also grateful in return, and harbours the same well-wishing towards
ourself. There can therefore be amor unilateralis; but strictly such well-wishing changes
into friendship (amicitia) through a reciprocal love, or amor bilateralis” (V 408).
Trust is also a component of the highest form of friendship according to Kant. He
defines this form of friendship in MM as “the complete confidence of two persons in revealing
their secret judgments and feelings to each other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with
mutual respect” (MM 263). This definition coincides with the trust criterion of intimate
relationships. Kant goes on to discuss the importance of this trust as a fulfillment of one’s need
to disclose one’s thoughts to another: “We all have a strong impulse to disclose ourselves, and
enter wholly into fellowship” (LE 206). Yet, one can only do this if she is confident the
disclosed information will not be used against her or be detrimental to the respect the other
person has for her. Kant writes that someone without such a relationship,
would like to discuss with someone what he thinks about his associates, the government,
religion and so forth, but he cannot risk it: partly because the other person, while
prudently keeping back his own judgments, might use this to harm him, and partly
because, as regards disclosing his faults, the other person may conceal his own, so that he
would lose something of the other’s respect by presenting himself quite candidly to him
(MM 263).
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The major difference between Kant’s account of friendship and intimate relationships is
Kant’s focus on equality (V 408 and MM 262). This added criterion simply makes Kant’s
definition of friendship more restrictive than the definition of intimate relationships; nonetheless,
a Kantian friendship would still count as an intimate relationship because it meets all the criteria
necessary for the relationship to be categorized as intimate. Using Kant’s more restrictive term
friendship as a proxy for intimate relationships has some important consequences. If Kant can
successfully account for the moral value he grants friendships, one might still criticize Kant for
failing to account for the moral value of other sorts of intimate relationships. On the other hand,
if Kant cannot account for the moral value of friendships, relationships which he admits are
morally valuable, then his theory falls short of justifying even his own claims about these
relationships.
Part III: Kant’s Critics
Williams, Stocker, and Blum each attempt to show that the theoretical constraints of
Kant’s moral theory prevent thorough-going Kantians from actually having and valuing the sort
of friendships about which Kant writes. Herman sorts the various criticisms into three main
objections: 1. Kantians must be more concerned with fulfilling duty than the objects of duty, 2.
Kantians must disavow the emotions as morally valuable motives, 3. Kantians’ attachment to
living according to the dictates of morality undermines their commitment to other people.
The first of these objections claims that the Kantian insistence on acting from the motive
of duty precludes a real concern for the objects of action. This would prove problematic for
intimate relationships because people in intimate relationships are supposed to act for one
another as ends. For example, if one has a duty to teach one’s child philosophy, then a moral
Kantian’s motive and end in fulfilling this duty must be to respect the moral law. Neither the
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teaching of philosophy to one’s child nor one’s child herself is the direct end of the action but
simply a means to acting morally: the goal of the action is to respect the moral law not to help
the child. Stocker and Blum both give examples that attempt to show the problematic
relationship between moral motives and ethical ends. Stocker explains how visiting someone in
the hospital from the motive of duty does not indicate a concern for that person or her health as
an end.101 He writes “When someone acts for the sake of goodness, the goodness is his goal.” 102
He also argues in “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” that the motive of doing the
right thing conflicts with the correct objects of those motives. For example, Adam promises
Ryan that he will help him study for a test. The question is what Adam’s motive is for keeping
the promise. According to Stocker, the object of Adam’s motive is Ryan: Ryan is the person
Adam is helping study. However, Stocker believes that a Kantian’s motive must be “to do what
is morally right” which makes no mention of Ryan whatsoever. This makes some objects of
morally good actions, such as intimate relationships, impossible.103 Blum contrasts the motives
of two people helping a third. He argues that the person motivated only by Kantian duty would
not be concerned with the person being helped. This reveals the unimportance of that person as
an object of morally motivated action.104 Blum explicitly denies a Kantian connection between
acting from a duty to benefit someone and acting for the end of that person or her benefit.105
The second objection facing Kantians is that they view the emotions as insufficient
motives for moral action. This implies that many of the emotions and desires that constitute
intimate relationship do not have moral worth. According to this characterization of Kant, an
action motivated by an emotion, or anything other than duty, is not morally good. He writes,
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Thus, for instance, I should seek to further the happiness of others, not as though its
realization was any concern of mine (whether because of direct inclination or of some
satisfaction related to it indirectly through reason); I should do so merely because the
maxim which excludes it from my duty cannot be comprehended as a universal law in
one and the same volition (FM 60).
This is seen by Williams and Blum as an impoverished view of morality generally and
specifically the moral worth of actions. Williams writes that certain actions have value precisely
because they are “the product of an emotional response.”106 Blum’s entire book Friendship,
Altruism and Morality offers an argument for the moral value of emotions. He writes that
The Kantian view of feelings and emotions and its view of morality constitute a powerful
and influential tradition of thought, which would deny a substantial role to sympathy,
compassion, and concern in morality and moral motivation.107
Blum also offers a couple of reasons for Kantians’ dismissal of emotions as moral motives.108
First, Kantians believe emotions are not reliable enough to motivate consistent, principled, moral
action. Acting on the dictates of rationality will always result in consistent action because
rationality will not vary from one situation to another. On the other hand, emotions are
dependent on the circumstance and can lead to contradictory actions. The circumstantial nature
of emotions also makes universalizing them as a motive problematic, and for Kantians
universalizing the maxim of an action ensures its impartiality.
The final objection against Kantianism is that its followers must alienate themselves from
their interpersonal relationships to live a moral life. In order to act morally Kantians must put
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respect for the moral law above all other commitments. According to Williams this sort of
requirement is an attack on an individual’s integrity. Williams writes that “impartial morality, if
the conflict really does arise, must be required to win; and that cannot necessarily be a
reasonable demand on the agent” because “there can come a point at which it is quite
unreasonable for a man to give up, in the name of the impartial good ordering of the world of
moral agents, something which is a condition of his having any interest in being around in that
world at all.”109 A moral agent is required to make every other commitment in her life secondary
to her commitment to the moral law. To illustrate the problematic nature of this point Williams
uses the example of a man who may save one person among many from drowning after a
shipwreck. The man’s wife is one of the people drowning. According to Williams, a Kantian
would be required to “check” the permissibility of saving his wife rather than someone else in
order to be truly impartial. Yet, this sort of “check” is at odds with the man’s commitment to his
wife and could indicate a lack of appropriate concern for his relationship with her. The man’s
integrity is threatened because his Kantian leanings force him to violate his commitment to his
wife by placing morality above that commitment; furthermore, the man’s devotion to his wife is
a central part of his identity that he must question in the face of morality’s dictates.
Part IV: A Kantian Response to Criticism
Herman attempts to respond to each of these three criticisms in PMJ. She writes that the
charge that Kantians are concerned only with respecting the moral law when they act rests on an
incorrect assumption about the relationship between the motives and ends of actions. Herman
also seeks to clarify the role of emotions in moral action on a Kantian view in an attempt to
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overcome the criticism that the emotions fail as moral motives. Finally, Herman disagrees that
one must be alienated from other people in order to live up to Kantian standards.
Herman argues that the motive for an action and the object of that action are not
necessarily one in the same. The object of an action is the end, or goal, of that action: what one
is trying to accomplish by acting. The motive for an action explains an agent’s reasons for
choosing a particular end. To return to a previous example, the goal of one’s action could be that
one’s child learns philosophy. This end might be motivated by several distinct desires: a desire
to respect the moral law, a desire to discuss philosophy with one’s child, a desire to increase the
child’s ability to reason critically, or even a desire for one’s child to earn a scholarship to college
via the increase in the child’s standardized test scores that often accompanies the study of
philosophy. The same end, one’s child learning philosophy, may have multiple motivating
desires. Similarly, the objects of a single motive may change based on the circumstances
accompanying the motive. A desire for one’s child to earn a scholarship may lead to different
objects of action depending on the child’s natural talents: if the child has superlative hand eye
coordination but less than stellar test scores the object of this particular motive might be to have
one’s child practice baseball rather than study philosophy. Herman uses the example of promise
keeping to make this point. She writes,
Consider a case of acting from the motive of duty according to the principle, “Keep the
promises you make.” (Call this principle P.) The motive of duty prompts me to act as
morality (or P) requires: to do what is right. What the motive of duty prompts me to do,
then, is to keep my promise. The object of my action in following P is to do whatever it
is I promised to do. I am moved to do this thing because P requires it; that is my reason
for doing it, the nature of my interest in it. I am not trying to bring about “kept promises”
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or even “my kept promises.” (I will not have made the world a morally better place if I
make and keep more promises than I now have reason to do.) I am trying to do what I
promised because I promised to do it: that is, I act from the motive of duty (PMJ 25-26).
In fact, Herman describes an action motivated by duty with the object of conforming to duty
“rule-fetishism” and contrasts it with acting dutifully (PMJ 27). Of helping dutifully she writes,
“Again, one does not help in order to satisfy a moral rule; the rule requires that you take the need
of another as a reason to help” (PMJ 29). To return to the example of Adam promising to help
Ryan study, Herman argues that, as a Kantian, Adam’s object in keeping his promise would be to
help Ryan study. If instead Adam did not keep his promise with the object of helping Ryan, but
simply because he is trying to keep all the promises he makes then he is missing the point of
Kantian morality: that other people are ends in themselves. On this account, a Kantian can be
motivated by duty to act for the other in an intimate relationship and the resulting action will
have moral worth: Adam can be motivated by duty to act for Ryan’s sake when he keeps his
promise and his action will have moral worth.
Herman examines the emotions’ role in Kantian moral motivation in an attempt to show
that Kantians are not as opposed to the emotions’ involvement in moral actions as some of their
critics suspect. First, Herman addresses the notion that Kantians dismiss the emotions as moral
motives because they are unreliable. Herman argues that the real problem Kantians have with
the emotions is not their unreliability in leading to moral action but their lack of connection to
moral duty. She writes, “Emotion-based motives fail to support the necessary internal
connection between the motive and the rightness of a proposed action. This is why Kant holds
that maxims of action based on the motive of sympathy have no ‘moral content’” (PMJ 30).110
Nevertheless, Herman admits that this position too is at odds with Williams’ critique of
110
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Kantians: that they are unable to respond to others in ways that are appropriate given their
interpersonal relationships. Herman revises the objection: “The worry is that if the Kantian
agent is required to act from the motive of duty, then when morality is at issue, his responses to
others will be less personal, less an expression of his feeling for them” (PMJ 31). She responds
to this objection by noting that many actions that one would undertake for another are not
matters of perfect duty; thus, in such cases the moral law is only a limiting condition (PMJ 31).
Respect for the moral law, when acting as a limiting condition, is not a motive for action;
therefore, emotions can be morally acceptable motivations for many of the actions that support
intimate relationships. Herman also argues that Kantians can be emotionally motivated to help
others rather than being motivated out of a sense of duty to act beneficently. She writes this
despite the fact that the dutiful act would be morally valuable and the emotionally motivated act
would not. Her justification for this claim is that the good will’s value is unaffected by the
number of acts to which it leads (PMJ 35). A lost opportunity to act from the motive of duty is
morally unimportant as long as the good will is ready to act should the emotional motivation
prove insufficient to effect the morally called for action. For example, imagine Jenn has a
perfect duty to keep her promise not to cheat on Jared, but Jared would prefer that Jenn keep her
promise out of a sense of love than a sense of duty. Critics would argue that to be an upstanding
Kantian Jenn would have to disappoint Jared and keep her promise out of a sense of duty rather
than love. Herman’s point is that Jenn does nothing immoral according to Kant if she keeps her
promise out of a sense of love rather than a sense of duty because there is no moral imperative to
maximize instantiations of the good will (PMJ 36).
This leads Herman to reject the third objection to Kantianism: that living a moral life
leads to alienation and violations of one’s integrity. She admits that the projects and people one
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commits to can tempt one toward immoral actions, but she disagrees that Kantianism necessarily
alienates one from those commitments in a way that destroys one’s integrity. Herman disputes
these claims by focusing on morality’s role as a limiting condition and the possibility of one’s
commitment to a moral life. As previously discussed, the moral law’s role as a limiting
condition enables a Kantian to be morally motivated by non-moral desires and act for non-moral
ends in a wide range of cases. Thus, one can be directly motivated by a desire to care for a
friend or act for the good of one’s parent. When there is no conflict between morality and one’s
commitments, integrity is clearly not threatened. Herman writes,
For morality to respect the conditions of character (one’s integrity as a person), it must
respect the agent’s attachments to his projects in a way that permits his actions to be an
expression of those attachments. Kantian morality, understood as a morality of limits,
can do this (PMJ 39).
However, Williams is also seriously concerned about cases in which the two do conflict.
Herman deals with this concern by introducing the idea that some people commit themselves to
living a moral life:
[Williams’] sketch of the relations between the conditions of character and morality
places morality outside the projects that give meaning to a life, even when the projects
the agents identifies with have moral content. But an attachment to impartial morality
can itself be a project that gives a life meaning. It is a defining feature of Kantian
morality that one basic attachment, one self-defining project, is morality itself… As one
can define oneself in part through a variety of impersonally described roles (American,
feminist, university professor), so living a moral life can be partially constitutive of
character (PMJ 38).
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Even if Williams acknowledged this point, he might still argue that morality’s precedence over
all other projects violates one’s integrity. Herman disagrees. Any two commitments may
conflict at any time and an agent would be forced to choose between them. Such occurrences are
commonplace, yet they do not qualify as violations of integrity. One may take morality to be a
guiding and life-defining commitment without threatening her integrity. Williams gives no
reason to think that morality is a less appropriate commitment to guide one’s life than any other
or that the choice to make an overriding commitment to something else is morally
irreproachable. For example, a parent’s overriding commitment to her child can lead her to act
immorally toward other children despite the positive moral value of the relationship.
Furthermore, a Kantian could criticize the overriding nature of the commitment to the child
without condemning the commitment itself. One can combine these points to offer a response to
Williams’ example of a man saving his drowning wife. First, it should now be clear that the man
can be motivated by his love for his wife to act for her sake in saving her. Second, while
Kantianism is a limiting condition even in this case its role as such does not alienate the man
from his wife or violate his integrity. Herman writes “What the Kantian requires is only that he
not view his desire to save his wife as an unconditionally valid reason. This does not stand in the
way of the direct expression of attachments in action” and adds in a footnote “We do not want to
forget that a normal moral agent knows things: he does not have to figure out whether it is
permissible to save his wife. He knows it is, and that partly explains why he can act
spontaneously, from feeling, and yet according to principle” (PMJ 42). This is made even
clearer when Williams’ example is changed so that the man must do something immoral in order
to save his wife, such as tipping over a lifeboat filled with several small children and one adult.
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In this modified example there is no clearly inappropriate violation of his integrity or his
commitment to his wife when the man consults morality before deciding whether to save her.
Part V: Kantian Friendships Are Morally Permissible But Not Valuable
Herman’s responses to Kant’s critics successfully show that Kantians can have intimate
relationships, but these relationships do not have moral value. It is morally permissible for
Kantians to love other people. Herman’s discussion of the emotions’ role in Kantian ethics
shows that emotions such as love are not morally problematic as long as they are constrained by
the dictates of the moral law. The Kantian moral prohibition against actions that violate the
moral law is not a moral imperative that all actions that can be motivated by duty must be
motivated by duty. Thus, it is morally permissible to be motivated by love to act for the other in
an intimate relationship even in cases where the action motivated by love is a perfect duty.
Moreover, this allows one to be sufficiently committed to one’s friends and does not necessarily
alienate one from one’s friends. However, neither these permitted actions nor the emotions that
motivate them have moral worth. Herman is quite clear that according to Kant’s moral theory
emotions such as care and love are morally permissible motives, but they cannot give rise to
morally valuable actions:
Let us first survey the kind of room that Kantian ethics provides for actions motivated by
care and concern for the other – what I will call “motives of connection.” … But
permitting action from motives of connection does not fully resolve the problem. Even
though there is nothing wrong with acting from a motive of connection in circumstances
of obligation, the Kantian is likely to insist that action so motivated has no moral worth.
The Kantian position is that the value signaled by moral worth is action done from a
motive that tracks morality (the motive of duty): only then is there a maxim of action
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with moral content. A dutiful action done from a motive of connection has a maxim with
a different content (PMJ 186).
This forces her to question whether the value of relationships is moral (PMJ 187). Despite her
best efforts to show that morality and relationships are not necessarily at odds with one another,
she never explains how actions that derive from motives of connection can be considered
morally valuable. Moral value and the value of intimate relationships must be seen as distinct on
Kant’s view. Therefore, one of the necessary constituents of intimate relationships, love for
another, does not have moral value. Kant claims that friendships, a type of intimate relationship,
are morally valuable, but his system of ethics cannot account for that value. This conflict stems
from Kantianism’s inability to regard actions that result from any motive besides respect for the
moral law as morally valuable.
Kant does find moral value in well-wishing toward others and acting for others as ends in
themselves. In V, Kant describes well-wishing as a duty: “For well-wishing to others is the
universal duty of love, which we owe to every man, since we must absolutely make it our maxim
to promote goodness in others” (V 408). Furthermore, the second formulation of the categorical
imperative obligates one to treat everyone as an end in himself or herself: “Act so that you treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a
means only” (FM 47). These components of friendship, then, are not merely permissible but
morally valuable according to Kant. Yet, according to Kant these are duties each person owes to
every other person, when possible, not just friends. These duties are, in fact, fulfilled through
intimate relationships and countless other relationships. Therefore, the moral goodness Kantians
can impart to intimate relationships according to the fulfillment of these duties is no different
than the goodness imparted to much more transient relationships. Additionally, according to
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Kant the mutuality of a relationship does count towards the relationship’s status as a friendship,
but the mutuality of the well wishing or treatment of the other as an end in herself cannot add to
the goodness or moral worth of an action on his theory (V 408 and MM 263).
Baier, in her article “Trust and Antitrust,” further criticizes Kant, and others, for focusing
an account of trust on the trust that exists between equals. She writes, “But a complete moral
philosophy would tell us how and why we should act and feel toward others in relationships of
shifting and varying power asymmetry and shifting and varying intimacy.” Kant does spend
time in V endorsing the existence of trust between friends as being central to the relationship and
grounded in the dual obligations of love and respect (V 408). Nevertheless, Baier’s criticism is
still applicable because Kantian friendships must exist between equals. Though applicable,
Baier’s criticism is an unnecessary addition for the purposes of this dissertation. Her criticism
would be more important to this project if Kant could account for the moral value of friendships:
it would then serve as a critique of his inability to accurately depict the moral intricacies of other
intimate relationships. However, since Kant cannot sufficiently account for the moral value of
relationships without imbalances in power and with relatively stable intimacy, such as
friendships, and does discuss the moral importance of trust between equals, Baier’s critique is
not needed to show that Kant’s account of the moral value of intimate relationships is
problematic.
According to Kant, actions are extrinsic final goods that are morally valuable.
Combinations of these actions could comprise morally valuable Kantian friendships,
relationships which Kant himself deems morally good. It is morally permissible for Kantians to
have friendships in which the friends love one another. Friends who wish each other well, treat
each other as ends in themselves, and trust one another act in ways that have moral worth.
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However, these same actions initiated by casual acquaintances have the same moral worth.
When a Kantian acts from a motive of love, care, or concern for a friend the action has no moral
worth. This is problematic because, though Kant includes inclinations such as well-liking as an
important part of friendships, these necessary conditions of intimate relationships have no moral
value on his view. Therefore, a Kantian is left unable to account for the moral value of
friendships. While some of the actions that partially constitute friendships may be morally
valuable according to Kant, their moral value does not differ from that of actions carried out by
mere acquaintances.111
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Chapter 5: Moore and the Consequentialist Value of Intimate Relationships
Consequentialist arguments for the value of intimate relationships might at first seem
simple and straightforward: intimate relationships, on the whole, lead to more good
consequences than bad ones. This is an empirical claim and few philosophers are willing to
argue that intimate relationships lack instrumental value. However, the questions that have given
rise to more controversy are 1. whether consequentialist obligations allow for the cultivation of
intimate relationships and 2. whether consequentialists can account for final value in
interpersonal relationships in a way that is compatible with the definition of intimate
relationships such as close friendships. An interpersonal relationship may be instrumentally
good and worthy of cultivation according to consequentialist views, but interpersonal
relationships that lack final value according to the normative framework of consequentialism will
not qualify as intimate relationships.112
G.E. Moore’s account of normative ethics is an important test case for consequentialism’s
ability to capture the final value of intimate relationships because Moore, more clearly and
specifically than other consequentialists, defines friendship and sets friendships up as one of the
goods to be maximized. In one of Moore’s early papers, “Achilles or Patroclus?,”abbreviated AP
from this point on, he analyses friendship. He identifies it with love and explains the importance
of loving and acting for others.113 In chapter six of the Principia Ethica, hereafter PE, Moore
discusses the value of human intercourse stating:
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By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of
consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse
and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. No one, probably, who has asked himself the
question, has ever doubted that personal affection and the appreciation of what is
beautiful in Art or Nature, are good in themselves; nor, if we consider strictly what things
are worth having purely for their own sakes, does it appear probable that any one will
think that everything else has nearly so great a value as the things which are included
under these two heads.114
Moore treats the pleasures of human intercourse, which he also calls personal affection, as one of
many intrinsic goods. His description of personal affection in PE connects to his explanation of
love in AP. 115 The aforementioned axiology, in conjunction with his expression of a
consequentialist normative theory in chapter five of the PE, leads to a pluralistic form of
consequentialism that holds friendships as one of the goods to be maximized (PE 149).
Part one of this chapter will detail Moore’s account of friendship and show that Moorean
friendships qualify as intimate relationships and that Moore considered those relationships to be
114
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valuable. In part two, the views of those who criticize consequentialism on the basis of its
inability to account for intimate relationships will be examined. Part three will evaluate potential
responses to the problems posed in part two. Finally, part four will see which of the problems
identified in part two persist and what piece of Moorean consequentialism’s structure is at the
root of its inability to acknowledge the value of intimate relationships.
Part I: Moorean Friendships
Moore details the requirements of a loving friendship in AP, in so doing he explains
interpersonal relationships that are quite similar to intimate relationships: both involve people
loving one another, wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that
regards one another as an end, doing so mutually or for one another, and trusting that the other
loves and wishes one well as an end. He later explains the value inherent in such relationships.
Moore writes that the passion of friendship is the permanent emotion he terms love (AP
3). He then goes on to list the identifying features of this passion. Moore explains that the desire
to see another person again is one of the first indicators of a developing friendship (AP 4). This
desire becomes an attraction to the other person. Moore writes “We are attracted not only by his
face, his voice, his manner, but also by his understanding, his morals, his feelings” (AP 4). The
desire and attraction lead to enjoyment whenever in the other’s presence: “…whether talking or
silent we shall shew that his presence gives us delight” (AP 4). This coincides with the
explanation of love that is part of an intimate relationship’s definition. Moore also writes
“Lastly, we shall always prefer his good to our own; we shall always be trying to give him
pleasure; and, if need be, shall be eager to die for him” (AP 5). This indicates that a Moorean
friend wishes well and acts for his friend’s good. Moore does not specify that one does this for
his friend’s own sake. Yet, the ideas that one’s friend’s good and life come before one’s own do
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make the conclusion more likely especially when coupled with Moore’s claims in the PE that
one’s friend is intrinsically valuable (PE 203). Moore addresses the necessity of mutuality to his
concept of friendship when he writes:
I have been describing friendship throughout on the understanding that it is mutual
between the two friends. If it be not, and one have a very strong passion for the other,
which is not at all or but little returned; then that man is as far the most miserable of men,
as he, whose love is returned, is the happiest. Such a passion, it seems to me, can never
really be as strong, as one that is satisfied: for it shews that there is something in the
object of love not perfectly sympathetic; his want of love for us, at all events, we cannot
love: therefore our love is not perfect (AP 5).116
Finally, while Moore does not explicitly discuss trust between friends, he does write that
“From him we shall have no secrets at all; all that concerns him will be interesting to us;
and we shall not scruple to speak to him plainly, what we think, of all those persons and
things which may seem to affect him most nearly; it will be impossible for us to wound
his prejudice or his pride” (AP 5).
The secrets and open discussions Moore here discusses fit with Annette Baier’s claim that
“Trust, on the analysis I have proposed, is letting other persons (natural or artificial, such as
firms, nations, etc.) take care of something the truster cares about, where such "caring for"
involves some exercise of discretionary powers.”117 Moore indicates that friends allow each
other to take care of secrets, thus he implies that trust too is a vital part of friendships. Moore’s
account addresses each component of an intimate relationship: the love one feels for the other,
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the wishes and actions for the other’s good, the treatment of the other person as an end-inhimself, and the mutuality and trust involved in the relationships. Though Moore’s account uses
the word “friendship,” his analysis of friendship meets all the requirements of an intimate
relationship’s definition as established in the second chapter. Thus, Moorean friendships count
as intimate relationships. In fact, Moore is also open to the possibility of friendships existing
between two people who are unequal. The premise of AP is to explain how Achilles and
Patroclus can be perfect friends despite Achilles’ clear superiority (AP 1). Moorean friendships
and intimate relationships are the same things.118
Moore clearly considers friendships valuable as one of his goals in AP was to “… prove
friendship so immensely valuable…”(AP 1). By the time he wrote PE he considered personal
affection to be one of two ideal goods: goods that are highly valuable as ends in themselves (PE
184, 188-189). On Moore’s view personal affection is a highly complex organic unity made up
of the relationships between states of consciousness and the persons in which they exist and to
which they pertain (PE 189). Personal affection is a highly valuable intrinsic good because, like
aesthetic appreciation, it is an appropriate emotional response to the cognitive recognition of an
object’s beauty as well as true belief about the existence of the object and its beautiful qualities.
The emotional response is what links Moore’s account of intrinsic good in PE to his account of
friendship in AP. Moore defines friendship as the permanent emotion of love in AP, so
friendship can be an appropriate emotional response to the cognitive recognition of an object’s
118
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beauty. In other words, friendship is one form of personal affection. When personal affection is
good, and Moore is clear that it is not always so, the love one feels for one’s friend is an
appropriate response to one’s accurate understanding of the friend’s beautiful character and true
belief about the friend’s existence (PE 203). Furthermore, the friend is intrinsically valuable to a
high degree (PE 203).119
In chapter five of PE Moore explains how valuable unities fit into his larger
consequentialist theory. In a statement of the classic consequentialist normative structure Moore
writes:
“Our ‘duty,’ therefore, can only be defined as that action, which will cause more good to
exist in the Universe than any possible alternative. And what is ‘right’ or ‘morally
permissible’ only differs from this, as what will not cause less good than any possible
alternative. When, therefore, Ethics presumes to assert that certain ways of acting are
‘duties’ it presumes to assert that to act in those ways will always produce the greatest
possible sum of good” (PE 148).
The rightness of an action is determined by the good it causes. Moore argues throughout PE that
good cannot be analyzed down to some natural property but is a property in its own right (PE
chapters 2-4). This goodness, which he does not distinguish as being either moral or non-moral,
can be possessed by different organic unities (PE 188-189). As previously stated, personal
affection is one such unity. Thus, it is one’s duty to produce sums of good that include, but are
not limited to, the friendships he describes.
Part II: Consequentialism’s Critics

119

For Moore it is this last point that makes personal affection different than aesthetic appreciation, since the object
of aesthetic appreciation has minimal or no intrinsic value of its own.

Page 75

Many philosophers have criticized consequentialists’ ability to account for the value of
close interpersonal relationships like friendships. Moore is able to avoid some of these criticisms
simply by advocating a form of consequentialism that identifies the good with more than one
object. Thus, criticisms that target only a standard utilitarian system that sets up pleasure or
happiness as the singular good to be maximized and therefore must admit that interpersonal
relationships are always instrumental will not be addressed. The criticisms that remain can be
divided into two subcategories: those that target the consequentialist agent and those that
criticize the theoretical framework of consequentialism.120
The two most frequent criticisms of moral agents attempting to live by a consequentialist
system of ethics are that such agents, when motivated directly by their friends or family, cannot
be acting morally and that such agents become alienated from their friends and family. Both
criticisms are also leveled against Kantian moral agents as discussed in the preceding chapter.121
Michael Stocker specifically targets Moore’s version of consequentialism for separating reason
and motive when he writes:
The problem is not simply that pleasure is taken to be the only good, the only rightmaking feature. To see this, consider G. E. Moore's formalistic utilitarianism, which tells
us to maximize goodness, without claiming to have identified all the goods. If, as I would
have it and as Moore agrees, love relations and the like are goods, how could there be any
disharmony here? Would it not be possible to embody Moore's justifying reason as a
motive and still love? I do not think so. First, if you try to carry on the relationship for the
sake of goodness, there is no essential commitment even to that activity, much less to the
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persons involved. So far as goodness is involved, you might as well love as ski or write
poetry or eat a nice meal or …. Perhaps it would be replied that there is something special
about that good, the good of love treating it now not qua good but qua what is good or
qua this good. In such a case, however, there is again an impersonality so far as the
individuals are concerned. Any other person who would elicit as much of this good
would be as proper an object of love as the beloved. To this it might be replied that it is
that good which is to be sought with emphasis on the personal and individual features, the
features that bind these people together. But now it is not clear in what sense goodness is
being sought, nor that the theory is still telling us to maximize goodness. True, the theory
tells us to bring about this good, but now we cannot separate what is good, the love, from
its goodness. And this simply is not Moore's utilitarianism.122

If Stocker is right, then a thoroughgoing consequentialist will be unable to morally love another
as an end in himself and be unable to have intimate relationships.123
Moreover, according to Bernard Williams a consequentialist moral agent becomes
alienated from his friends and family when abiding by an overriding commitment to an
impersonal moral theory, whether Kantian or consequentialist, interferes with personal
commitments to one’s friends and family. In “A Critique of Utilitarianism” Williams attributes
this flaw to the strength of negative responsibility in consequentialism and writes:
For, to take the extreme sort of case, how can a man, as a utilitarian agent, come to regard
as one satisfaction among others, and a dispensable one, a project or attitude round which
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he has built his life, just because someone else’s projects have so structured the causal
scene that that is how the utilitarian sum comes out?124
In Moore’s case one could replace “satisfaction” with “good” or even be more specific and
replace it with “object of personal affection.” In either case the force of Williams’ question
remains: a commitment to Moore’s consequentialism seems to undermine one’s commitment to
one’s intimate relationships.
In Neera Badhwar’s article “Why It Is Wrong to Always Be Guided By the Best,” she
deals with several objections to consequentialist accounts of friendship including those just
discussed. However, rather than merely focusing on the problems a consequentialist agent has
being a good friend she traces those problems back to the structure of consequentialism. She
discusses two features of consequentialist theories that make their valuation of intimate
relationships problematic. First, the goods that are to be maximized are not moral goods.
Second, the goods that are to be maximized are not final goods.
Badhwar explains that the right and the good, the normative structure and axiology, of
consequentialism are completely separate from one another. The normative structure of
consequentialism explains the moral obligation to maximize good in the world. It does not
address or define the good. That is left to the axiology of the theory. For example, the
normative structure of Moore’s, John Stewart Mill’s, and Bentham’s accounts of
consequentialism are basically the same. What differentiate the three theories are their differing
axiologies: or definitions of the good. This complete separation, according to Badhwar, is one of
the reasons that consequentialism cannot account for the value of friendships. She writes, “The
heart of the problem, as I see it, lies in the very idea of morality (the right, the justified) as a
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means to an independent nonmoral good rather than as partly constitutive of the good
(teleology)…”125 She expands on this point in a footnote stating
… there is an occasional tendency to refer to the intrinsic good to be maximized as a
moral good. But the word ‘moral’ here merely signifies that morality is concerned with
maximizing goodness and not that there are different kinds of good, namely, the moral,
the immoral, and the nonmoral. This being the case, the use of the word ‘moral’ to
qualify “good” is at best redundant, and at worst misleading, since it blurs the contrast
with theories that do distinguish among moral, immoral, and nonmoral goods.126
Badhwar is arguing that the complete separation of normative structure from axiology employed
by consequentialism prevents the consequentialist from categorizing any set of goods as
particularly moral. Thus, even Moore’s theory that explicitly states personal affection and its
objects, such as friendships, are good cannot accurately term them “morally good” since the
consequentialist axiology has no direct connection to its normative framework, the one piece of
the theory that is particularly moral. So according to Badhwar, it is impossible to assign moral
value to friendships on a consequentialist theory such as Moore’s.
Badhwar’s second objection to consequentialism is that it requires an instrumental
justification for friendship.127 Moore is clear about the intrinsic value of personal affection, but
the structure of consequentialism requires that each intrinsically valuable object’s existence be
justified by its place in the whole. In other words, despite the goodness of friendships being
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located in the friendships themselves, consequentialism still requires that their value be appraised
in relation to their place in the maximally good state of affairs. Badhwar writes:
For the problematic feature of [consequentialism] is not that it sometimes calls for a
renunciation of friendship on account of its consequences but that it sees the moral worth
of friendship as entirely dependent on its total consequences, with no independent moral
weight assigned to its worth for the individuals involved. However, within a moral
theory that regards friendship as moral in its own right… the fact that a certain friendship
is promoting net disvalue… does not entail that the friendship is unjustified.128
Badhwar believes consequentialism is unable to account for the final value of friendships;
furthermore, Badhwar argues that friendships are justified by themselves, not their relationship to
a state of affairs with the most goodness in it. However, according to Moore’s consequentialism
even the ideal goodness of personal affection is not an end-in-itself. It is a means to the final
good: the state of affairs in which good has been maximized. Badhwar explains, “The problem
confronting [consequentialism] might be summarized thus: consequentialist teleology defines
intrinsic value in morally neutral terms and morality as a means to [final] value.”129
Part III: Consequentialist Responses
Moore, himself, did not respond to these criticisms; however, later consequentialists with
normative views similar to Moore’s have responded to the charges leveled against their theories.
Peter Railton in “Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality” (abbreviated ACD
from this point on) argues that an objective form of pluralistic consequentialism, similar to
Moore’s, can overcome Stocker’s and Williams’ critiques.130 Additionally, when Moore’s
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axiology is compared to Kant’s it becomes clear that Moore’s desire not to qualify goodness is
not a problem for consequentialism’s appraisal of friendships as Badhwar claims.
Railton agrees that Stocker’s and Williams’ points, if accurate, would be problematic for
any moral theory to which they apply. He writes
First, we must somehow give an account of practical reasoning that does not merely
multiply points of view and divide the self - a more unified account is needed. Second,
we must recognize that loving relationships, friendships, group loyalties, and spontaneous
actions are among the most important contributors to whatever it is that makes life
worthwhile; any moral theory deserving serious consideration must itself give them
serious consideration (ACD 139).
Railton also admits that certain forms of consequentialism are subject to the problems that
Stocker and Williams identify:
One mistake of dominant consequentialist theories, I believe, is their failure to see that
things other than subjective states can have intrinsic value. Allied to this is a tendency to
reduce all intrinsic values to one – happiness. Both of these features of classical
utilitarianism reflect forms of alienation (ACD 148).
However, Moore’s consequentialism has neither of these features and Railton proposes a
pluralistic version of consequentialism that is reminiscent of Moore’s (ACD 149,152). On this
view, Railton believes that one can avoid the pitfalls described by Stocker. Railton writes:
It becomes a complex matter to describe the psychology of intrinsic value. For example,
should we say that one values a relationship of solidarity, say, a friendship, because it is a
friendship? That makes it sound as if it were somehow instrumental to the realization of
some abstract value, friendship. Surely this is a misdescription… Similarly, a friendship
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is itself the valued thing, the thing of a valued kind. Of course, one can say that one
values friendship and therefore seeks friends, just as one can say one values happiness
and therefore seeks happy experiences. But this locution must be contrasted with what is
being said when, for example, one talks of seeking things that make one happy. Friends
are not "things that make one achieve friendship” they partially constitute friendships,
just as particular happy experience partially constitute happiness for an individual. Thus
taking friendship as an intrinsic value does not entail viewing particular friendships
instrumentally (ACD 149-150 in a footnote).131
Railton couples the above point with a description of a sophisticated consequentialist agent that
is able to avoid Stocker’s concerns. A sophisticated consequentialist is one who strives to lead
an objectively consequentialist life even at the cost of using non-consequentialist decision
making procedures (ACD 153).132 For example, if Shivang is a sophisticated consequentialist
that recognizes friendships as one of the intrinsically good things in the world to be maximized,
then he will strive to make friends. A consequentialist decision making procedure, however,
would likely hinder Shivang’s ability to make friends by turning his focus to efficiency and
speed in the development of a friendship rather than on the person with whom he is building a
relationship. After all, questions about another’s efficiency at friend-making are more likely to
send a potential friend running in the other direction than to open him up for conversation. Then,
it is only by focusing on the other person in non-consequentialist ways that Shivang can fulfill
the consequentialist maxim of creating more good by building friendships, and this is not
problematic for the sophisticated consequentialist that Railton describes. Elinor Mason even
131
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argues that one can be motivated directly by the other person in an intimate relationship without
contradicting background consequentialist motives.133 She does this by using a consequentialist
standard to evaluate the dispositions that an agent should cultivate. Mason claims that such a
standard would dictate that consequentialists develop dispositions to act out of concern for others
so long as friendship in general is consequentially worth pursuing. Once this disposition takes
hold and there is genuine concern for others, acting from that concern need not raise
consequentialist objections since the disposition was approved through consequentialist
justification and there is no new reason to doubt that justification.134 Railton gives several of his
own examples to show that a doing a consequentialist calculus may prevent an agent from
maximizing the good; therefore, in order to increase one’s chances of maximizing the good, one
can often use non-consequentialist reasoning.135 This can be applied to one’s interactions with
the other in an intimate relationship: one should not, according to consequentialism’s normative
structure, constantly calculate how to maximize the good when dealing with one’s intimate
relationships if doing so will harm or destroy those relationships (ACD 154). One can be
committed to the others in an intimate relationship as ends rather than means to abstract good
since doing so will in fact be the only way to maximize the abstract good on consequentialist
theories like Moore’s. Additionally, one need not ask oneself whether one’s particular intimate
relationships are the maximally good ones at every moment. Even when the relationships are
133
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maximally good, questioning the relationship will threaten to destroy that good, for example, by
destroying the trust that exists between those in an intimate relationship. At the same time, there
is still room for normative reflection on one’s intimate relationships, in terms of the good they
create or destroy, in case they are leading one to grossly immoral acts (ACD 151).
This leads into Williams’ objection that the negative responsibility entailed by
consequentialism alienates practicing consequentialists from their relationships. The negative
responsibility entailed by even Railton’s version of consequentialism could force one to give up
or violate one’s intimate relationships. According to Williams, the realization that
consequentialism will sometimes clearly obligate an agent to choose some action over one’s
relationship alienates that agent from the other person in the relationship.136 Against this view
Railton argues that even such deeply held commitments as those made to intimate relationships
must, at some point, be morally evaluated in order to preserve one’s ability to make autonomous
decisions.137 Additionally, Railton points out the inevitability of conflict between any two
deeply held commitments:
It might be objected that one cannot really regard a person or a project as an end as such
if one’s commitment is in this way contingent or overridable. But were this so, we would
be able to have very few commitments to ends as such. For example, one could not be
committed to both one’s spouse and one’s child as ends as such, since at most one of
these commitments could be overriding in cases of conflict. It is easy to confuse the
notion of commitment to an end as such (or for its own sake) with that of an overriding
commitment, but strength is not the same as structure. To be committed to an end as
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such is a matter of (among other things) whether it furnishes one with reasons for acting
that are not mediated by other concerns (ACD 141-142).138
For example, one may have a sophisticated consequentialist commitment to both one’s child and
one’s spouse and not necessarily be alienated from either relationship, even in cases when one
commitment must override the other. For example, choosing to console one’s child rather than
one’s spouse when both are upset need not alienate one from one’s spouse. Additionally, as
Herman noted in her defense of Kant, morality itself can be one of these deeply held
commitments, it too can override other commitments without causing any more alienation than
the previous example.139 Therefore, the sophisticated consequentialist who chooses to fulfill his
obligation to save one million lives by sacrificing the life of his spouse, thereby showing a
commitment to consequentialism over a commitment to his spouse, is not necessarily alienated
from his spouse or other loved ones.140 Railton’s point is that it is normal for commitments to
conflict. When the commitment to a particular morality causes a conflict, that conflict is not
significantly different from the conflict caused by the commitment to two different people.
Williams’ argument fails as a criticism of a consequentialist theory’s ability to value intimate
relationships.
Moore not only addressed Badhwar’s claim that the value that a consequentialist theory
seeks to maximize is not specifically moral, he embraced it. Moore made a point of explaining
good as its own unanalyzable non-natural property in PE (PE 8-10). Goodness was not divided
up into different subcategories like moral and nonmoral. There was only one normative concept

138

A very similar argument is also made by Mason in Mason, E. 1999. “Do Consequentialists Have One Thought
Too Many?.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2(3): pg 248.
139
Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pg 53.
140
Here it is important to recall that the commitment to the spouse according to Railton is justified by
consequentialism but not through a consequentialist decision making procedure. See page 82 in this chapter.

Page 85

according to Moore: general goodness. Therefore, friendships are not morally good, but simply
good.
Kantian ethics is also unable to account for the moral goodness of intimate
relationships.141 This forced Herman to wonder whether friendships had a different, nonmoral,
sort of goodness.142 On this basis the Kantian account of intimate relationships’ goodness was
found deficient.143
It would seem that Moore’s consequentialist account of intimate relationships’ goodness
would be unacceptable for the same reason. However, this is not the case. The Kantian account
is problematic because by failing to assign moral goodness to intimate relationships it relegates
any goodness they possess to the realm of nonmoral goodness. Whatever this type of goodness
is, it must be different from moral goodness and could potentially conflict with it. A Moorean
consequentialist account fails to assign moral goodness to intimate relationships because for
Moore no such separable goodness exists: there is only general goodness. Moore’s discussion of
goodness in chapters two through four of PE is an attempt to establish the unanalyzable nature of
goodness. Subsequently, he asserts in chapter six that personal affection is good in this
unanalyzable way. Thus, on Moore’s view intimate relationships do possess this single version
of goodness. Furthermore, this goodness does not conflict with morality; it guides moral action.
Morality obligates people to maximize goodness, so goodness and intrinsically good objects
guide right action (PE 148). While intimate relationships are not morally good according to
Moore because nothing is morally good, they are still good generally and so must be taken into
account when acting morally: they are one sort of intrinsically good object that can contribute to
the maximally good state of affairs. They are also at least as relevant to morality as any other
141
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good. In fact, Moore’s claims about the magnitude of intimate relationships’ goodness would
seem to make them more relevant to morality than many other goods: Moore’s consequentialist
normative framework emphasizes maximizing good and the large quantity of goodness of
intimate relationships will often outweigh other objects that are less good (PE 188-189).
Morality is concerned with the good of intimate relationships according to Moore’s
consequentialism, but the same cannot be said of Kant’s theory.
Part IV: Moorean Relationships Are Intrinsically Valuable But Not Final Goods
Badhwar’s second objection to consequentialism also targets a piece of
consequentialism’s theoretical framework that Moore explicitly endorses. Moore is clear that
moral rightness is associated not with individual intrinsically good objects but with maximally
good states of affairs (PE 148). This means that, on Moore’s account of morality, states of
affairs are final goods; intrinsically good objects such as friendships are not. A final good is
something valued for its own sake.144 Yet, intrinsic goods are not valued for their own sake
according to Moore’s theory. They are instead valued for their place in a maximally good state
of affairs. A friendship may contain its value in itself and therefore meet Moore’s criteria for
intrinsic goodness; nevertheless, the friendship’s place, or lack thereof, in a maximally good state
of affairs is still paramount according to the theoretical framework of consequentialism. The
very same logic shows that friends cannot be assigned final value either according to
consequentialism’s normative structure: the friend is not the goal of consequentialist action but a
means to producing a maximally good state of affairs. The intrinsic goods of Moore’s theory are
only instrumentally good since their value relies on their connection to the final good: the
maximally good state of affairs. This may not be troublesome when accounting for the value of
intrinsic goods such as beauty which need not be a final value, but this is a serious problem for
144
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friendships. As discussed in chapter three, friends cannot be valued as only instrumental goods.
Friends who are not valued as final goods are not in an intimate relationship with one another
because the friends are numerically replaceable, do not value one another and/or relationship
directly, and do not make the other the object of concern in the relationship. If, in Badhwar’s
terms, a relationship must rely on its place in the maximally good state of affairs for its
justification, then interpersonal relationships cannot be valued as ends in themselves. Therefore,
they are not intimate relationships.145
This creates a conflict between Moore’s account of morality and his account of
friendship. Friendships are supposed to be one of the most valuable organic unities that exist,
but his consequentialist view is unable to register the final value of the relationships that he
deems so valuable. In failing to register the final value of interpersonal relationships,
consequentialism belies its inability to recognize intimate relationships. The theory is only able
to assign instrumental value to interpersonal relationships, so no interpersonal relationship could
ever meet the definition of intimate relationship on Moore’s view.
Moore is able to claim that friendships have intrinsic value based on intuition (PE 188189). His axiology, itself, does not present a problem for intimate relationships. However, once
this axiology is combined with the normative structure of consequentialism the resulting moral
theory is incapable of according final value to any of the intrinsic goods recognized by his
axiology. All the intrinsic goods are valuable as means to the creation of a state of affairs in
which the good has been maximized. Particular intimate relationships may or may not be
constitutive of this final good.146 When a relationship is not part of the maximally good state of
affairs it may be intrinsically good but is certainly not finally good. Intimate relationships such
145
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as friendships require that particular people in interpersonal relationships be final goods, or ends
in themselves. An interpersonal relationship may not be good. The goodness of an interpersonal
relationship may be superseded by some other final good forcing someone who wants to fulfill
his moral obligation to choose the other final good over the relationship. In either case, the
relationship could still meet the definition of an intimate relationship. Yet, a normative theory
that appraises the value of the other in an interpersonal relationship or the relationship itself to be
instrumental only cannot account for the value of an intimate relationship.
Moore speaks highly of interpersonal relationships’ value in both AP and PE. He
describes friendships as the sort of interpersonal relationships that meet the criteria of intimate
relationships and explains that they possess significant intrinsic goodness. In PE personal
affection is the greatest of the goods Moore describes. Despite Moore’s best efforts, his
pluralistic version of a consequentialist moral theory fails to account for the final value of any
interpersonal relationships and so cannot be said to even recognize the existence of those
relationships that are accorded final value by their participants: intimate relationships.
According to the normative structure of consequentialism only maximally good states of affairs
have final value and it is this feature of Moore’s moral theory that creates inconsistencies
between his account of morality and his account of the value of friendships. Moore’s axiology
explains that intimate relationships have intrinsic value. However, this is not enough to allow his
overall theory of moral rightness to capture the value of intimate relationships. The normative
framework of any maximizing form of consequentialism will prevent people in intimate
relationships from being accorded final value since the value of all relationships will depend on
the relationship’s place in a maximally good state of affairs. Thus relationships, on Moore’s
consequentialist view, cannot qualify as the friendships he describes.
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Chapter 6: Aristotle and the Value of Intimate Relationships
Aristotle’s account of ethics is well known and oft discussed. Aristotle directly addresses
friendships’ place in his ethical theory in books eight and nine of Nicomachean Ethics, hereafter
NE.147 The discussion of friendships in NE explores both the defining characteristics and value
of friendships. It is for this reason, perhaps, that Aristotle’s account of friendship has been the
focus of many articles on friendship and its specific place as part of a moral theory.148 The
combination of Aristotle’s own detailed discussion of friendships and their place in his moral
theory and the subsequent philosophical interest in his accounts of these subjects make his view
of ethics one that must be examined in any discussion of interpersonal relationships and their
value. Aristotle examines several forms of friendship, but the criteria he uses to define character
friendships qualify these relationships as intimate ones and part one of this chapter will explain
this link. Aristotle also provides a couple of arguments for the value of character friendships.
These arguments will be discussed in part two of this chapter to figure out what they conclude
about the value of character friendships. Finally, in part three of this chapter the conclusions of
part two will be analyzed and compared to the results of the analysis of G.E. Moore’s
consequentialist theory. This will paint a clearer picture of the categories of value character
friendships fall into according to Aristotle.
Part I: Aristotelian Friendships as Intimate Relationships
Aristotle uses the word “φιλία” to discuss many different interpersonal relationships even
though it is most often translated to the English word “friendship.” Some of the relationships
that Aristotle delineates with the word “φιλία” are much more casual than intimate relationships
while others meet all the criteria of intimate relationships’ definition. This raises three questions
147
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that must be addressed before proceeding to questions about the value of intimate relationships
according to Aristotle: 1. what criterion unifies Aristotle’s various uses of the word “φιλία,” 2.
what criteria separate the highest form of φιλία from its other forms, and 3. how do the criteria
that Aristotle sets for the highest form of φιλία measure up to the criteria of intimate
relationships.
Aristotle identifies three kinds of friendship in NE: friendship based on pleasure, utility,
and character (NE 1156a7). The reason people form a friendship, or the object of love in a
friendship, is what distinguishes one kind of friendship from another (NE 1155b17).
Nevertheless, all three relationships are friendships according to Aristotle because in all three the
friends wish one another good for their own sake (NE 1156a3). Aristotle reiterates this definition
in the Rhetoric, when he writes “We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing
for him what you believe to be good things not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined,
so far as you can, to bring these things about” (Rhetoric 1381a2).149 A.D.M. Walker argues in
“Aristotle’s Account of Friendship in the ‘Nicomachean Ethics,’” hereafter AAFNE, that mutual
goodwill, along with reciprocal affection and a mutual awareness of the affection and goodwill,
makes up necessary and sufficient conditions of any friendship.150 Yet, the idea of wishing
another well for her own sake seems to be at odds with the self gratifying nature of pleasure and
utility friendships.151 Aristotle writes “Now those who love each other for their utility do not
love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So
too with those who love for the sake of pleasure” (NE1156a10). Despite the concept of
selflessness that seems to be involved in the unifying criterion of friendship, Aristotle also seems
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clear that the reason for the love involved in friendships of pleasure and utility is a self serving
one.
John Cooper addresses this apparent conflict in his article “Aristotle on the Forms of
Friendship,” hereafter AFF.152 Cooper examines three possible interpretations of Aristotle’s
claim that there exists mutual well wishing for the sake of the friend in all three kinds of
friendship: that one wishes well for one’s friend so that one can get a benefit, that one merely
wishes well for one’s friend but not for the friend’s sake, and that the well wishes are responses
to the relationship and so grounded as much in the relationship’s past as its future.153
First, Cooper is clear to explain what is and is not meant by Aristotle’s concept of
wishing or acting “for the other’s sake.” He writes that it means “…at least, that the fact that the
other person needs or wants, or would be benefited by, something is taken by the agent as by
itself a reason for doing or procuring that something, and that he acts for that reason” (AFF 621).
It also means that this reason is sufficient but not necessarily the only or even the strongest
motivating reason behind the action (AFF 621-622). Additionally, Cooper points out “Nothing
specific is implied about the psychological source or nature of the agent’s concern for the other
person…” (AFF 622). The concern may be motivated out of either a specific emotional
attachment to the friend or a much more generic concern for the welfare of others.
When Aristotle writes “To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing
goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons” one might interpret
him as meaning that one could wish one’s friend well for the object of the friendship (NE
152
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1156a3-5, AFF 631). This does not pose a large problem in the case of character friendships, but
is problematic when applied to pleasure and utility friendships; to wish one’s friend well for the
pleasure or utility it will bring one does not qualify as wishing one’s friend well for her own
sake. For example, Michelle is Heather’s friend because she gets pleasure out of trying new ice
cream parlors with Heather. In this case, if Michelle wishes Heather well at her job simply so
that Heather can continue to afford going to new ice cream parlors with Michelle, then Michelle
is not wishing Heather well for her own sake but for the sake of Michelle’s continued pleasure.
Thus, a charitable reader of Aristotle will reject this problematic interpretation.
A second possibility is that Aristotle means that all friends must wish each other well, but
not necessarily for their own sakes (AFF 632). This possibility could be supported by the text in
NE 1155b32-1156a5 where Aristotle declines to add the idea of the well wishing being for the
friend’s own sake to the more isolated idea of well wishing he is examining. However, Cooper
argues that this too is unlikely considering how many other times in NE, the Rhetoric, and
Eudemian Ethics Aristotle does combine the two ideas when discussing friendship (AFF 632).
Finally, by examining why one wishes one’s character friend good for her own sake
Cooper suggests that one wishes one’s pleasure and utility friends well in light of, or as a
response to, the fact that they bring one pleasure and utility (AFF 633). In this sense, one wishes
one’s friends well for their own sakes not so much for prospective but for more retrospective
reasons: more in appreciation for past good done for one than in anticipation of future good one
might receive (AFF 633). To return to the previous example, Michelle and Heather are pleasure
friends whose relationship is founded on the pleasure they get from trying new ice cream parlors
together. Michelle may wish her pleasure friend Heather well because she genuinely wants
Heather to be well as a result of their relationship. In this case, Michelle does not wish her well
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simply for the purpose of receiving more pleasure from their friendship. She is not, for example,
wishing Heather well at her job simply so that she can continue to afford going to new ice cream
parlors. Importantly, as Cooper points out, Michelle would not wish Heather some good that
would prevent further pleasure coming from the relationship or impede their relationship and the
continuance of the pleasure Michelle received from the relationship, at least not as part of the
well wishing that constituted their friendship.154 So, Michelle would not wish that Heather go on
a diet that involved giving up ice cream even if doing so would make Heather more temperate
(so long as the two are merely pleasure friends). Certainly relationships like that of Michelle and
Heather do exist in real life. Teammates in casual sports leagues might often fall into this sort of
relationship: they enjoy playing the sport together, may be familiar enough with one another to
wish each other well, but not familiar enough with one another to wish them some good that
would prevent the fielding of a full team and put a stop to the pleasure of playing the sport on a
consistent basis.
It, then, does seem possible that all three kinds of friendship are unified by the criterion
of mutual well wishing for the sake of the other. This means that character friendships must be
distinguished from pleasure and utility friendships by some criterion other than the selflessness
of the well wishing that exists in all friendships. Perhaps the most significant difference between
character friendship and the other two kinds of friendship is the object of the relationship. In a
character friendship one is attracted not to the pleasure or utility that may come from one’s
character friend but to the friend herself (NE 1156a7-8). For this reason Aristotle points out that
character friendships aim at the essential rather than incidental features of friends (NE 1156a1820, 1156b11-12, 1157b3-4). Elijah Millgram writes “Being virtuous is a large part of what it is
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to be a human being, whence of what it is to be the virtuous person that one is. On the other
hand, being useful to me and being pleasant to me are not a part of being who one is.”155 It is the
friends’ natures that give rise to the friendly feelings that are the foundation of character
friendships (NE 1156b10-11). These are importantly different from the incidental features that
give rise to the friendly feelings that ground pleasure and utility friendships. For example,
Michelle and Julie’s generosities are virtues that are essential parts of their characters, or who
they are according to Aristotle: those generosities can give rise to friendly feelings that form the
basis of a character friendship between the two. Conversely, the pleasures Michelle and Heather
get from trying new ice cream parlors together are incidental features of the two: the additional
pleasures they get from enjoying the ice cream together are not a part of their characters, but they
are what the two aim at in their pleasure friendship. Cooper writes:
Bearing in mind these important differences between character-friends and the other two
types, one might say, with some justice, that only character-friends really love one
another, that only they really wish one another well for one another’s sake. By this, one
would mean that only character-friends concern themselves with the actual persons,
themselves, that their friends are (AFF 640-641).156
Michelle may wish Heather well in her job without being directly concerned with her ability to
afford her trips to new ice cream parlors, but Michelle’s lack of willingness to wish Heather the
good of temperance shows that she is not concerned with Heather’s character as she is with that
of Julie. As a result, on Aristotle’s view Michelle is not concerned with Heather as an individual
even when wishing Heather goods completely unrelated to Michelle’s pleasure.
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A final difference between the kinds of friendship that Aristotle mentions is their
durations (NE 1156a23-24,1156b11-12,33). Character friendships last a long time due to their
foundation in relatively stable moral characters (NE 1156b17). On the other hand, “… the useful
is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the motive of the friendship is done away,
the friendship is dissolved…” (NE 1156a23-24). The same is true of pleasure friendships (NE
1156a33-36). This makes pleasure and utility friendships as transient as the pleasures and
utilities they grant the friends: much more transient than character friendships.
Character friendships share the criterion of wishing others well for their own sakes with
the other two kinds of friendship and are separated from them by their focus on the essential
features of the friends. Both of these criteria are important in identifying character friendships
with intimate relationships in which the members love, wish, and act for one another mutually as
an ends in themselves while trusting one another.
Aristotle specifically addresses each of the components of intimate relationships in his
account of character friendships. The word Aristotle repeatedly uses to convey the love that
exists in friendships is “στἐργειν” (NE 1156a15, 1157a11, 28, 1161bl8, 25, 1162a12, b30,
1164a10, 1167a3, 1168a2, 7, 22). Cooper writes that στἐργειν “… is used most often to apply to
a mother’s love for her children and other such close family attachments” (AFF 629). στἐργειν
then conveys the idea that friends have strong positive emotions toward one another. The
affection Aristotle is discussing can exist in different levels and between different types of
partners. It would cover some of the feelings that exist between lovers, parents and their
children, and those who share a close friendship as understood in a more colloquial sense.
Aristotle writes about a social virtue that “For the man who corresponds to this middle state is
very much what, with affection added, we call a good friend. But the state in question differs
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from friendship in that it implies no passion or affection for one’s associates” (NE 1126b20-23).
This emphasizes the necessity of affection as a component of friendship. He adds “Now since
friendship depends more on loving, and it is those who love their friends that are praised, loving
seems to be the characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this is found in
due measure that are lasting friends and only their friendship that endures” (NE 1159a33-35).
Moreover, Aristotle discusses the pleasure character friends will take in one another’s presence:
“So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other,
since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good
are the same or like” (NE 1156b15-18). Thus, character friends and people in intimate
relationships both feel love for one another and take pleasure in one another’s company. The
criteria of wishing one another well and acting for one another is clearly defined to be part of
friendships in the aforementioned quotation from the Rhetoric: “We may describe friendly
feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things not for your own
sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about” (Rhetoric
1381a2). This quotation also mentions the idea of acting for the other as an end in herself, which
was discussed previously as an identifying criterion of character friendships as opposed to
pleasure and utility friendships. Character friendships are based in the essential features of the
friends so when one loves, wishes, and acts for one’s character friend one must also recognize
those features of the friend that make her an end in herself. Aristotle is also very clear that
friendships must be mutual relationships when he writes “But to those who thus wish good we
ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being
friendship” (NE 1155b32-34).157 He also writes about the role of trust in character friendships
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stating that potential friends do not actually become friends until trust exists between them (NE
1156b28). He adds “… and it is among good men that trust and the feeling that ‘he would never
wrong me’ and all the other things that are demanded in true friendship are found” (NE 1157a2224).
Two other issues that Aristotle addresses are the equality of those involved in friendships
and the ability of imperfectly moral people to be character friends. The two issues are related to
one another because if both people in a character friendship must be equals and morally perfect,
then Aristotle’s definition of character friendship will be applicable to very few people. Any
value that such relationships have would be infrequently realized in the real world. Aristotle
writes that people who are quantitatively unequal will have difficulty being friends: “This
becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else
between the parties; for then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be so” (NE
1158b35). He also writes “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in
virtue” and “But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent for such men are rare”
(NE 1156b6 and b24-25). Cooper writes that this “… seems to imply that only to fully virtuous
persons – heroes of intellect and character – is it open to form a [character friendship]” (AFF
624). Despite the seeming force of these points Aristotle also writes about friendships between
unequal people such as fathers and sons and husbands and wives in book VIII chapter seven of
NE.158 In the former case the two people are unequal in the authority they have over one another
and in the second, according to Aristotle, unequal morally (AFF 628). Nevertheless, “… the
friendships of such persons will be abiding and excellent” as long as each party renders what
158
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they ought to the other (NE 1158b20-25). He also writes “… for not only can equally good men
become friends but a better man can make friends with a worse…” (1162a36-1162b1). Thus,
even those unequal in virtue can be character friends. Cooper writes “So in this case we will
have a virtue-friendship where the superior person likes the inferior for such virtues as he has (or
some of them), while recognizing that his character is not totally good” (AFF 628). This leaves
open the possibility that neither friend needs to be morally perfect to engage in a character
friendship.
Part II: Aristotle’s Arguments for Friendships’ Value
Aristotle explicitly states “… friendship to be desirable in itself” (NE 1159a25). Yet,
Kant and Moore also claim that friendship is valuable as an end in itself and their theories could
not account for such final value. Aristotle, though, provides two arguments to support his claim:
the arguments that a friend is necessary for self-knowledge and encourages virtuous activity.
Each of these arguments concludes that friendship has contributory value to the final good.
However, to fully understand the value of character friendships in Aristotle’s theory, one must
first understand the general relationship of friendship to the highest of all goods: eudaimonia.
Aristotle famously claims that “every pursuit aims at some good” and that the highest
good is eudaimonia, which is identified with “living well and doing well” (NE 1095a13-19). It
is eudaimonia that is what “... we call final without qualification that which is desirable in itself
and never for the sake of something else” (NE 1097a34-35). One who is living well is eudaimon
and can be said to be happy and flourishing. Aristotle admits that other things are valuable as
ends in themselves too such as pleasure, reason, and virtue (NE 1097b1-3). Aristotle also states
that to live a flourishing or eudaimon life one must possess certain external goods as well (NE
1153b17–19). At the outset of his discussion of friendship Aristotle classifies friendship as one
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of the most important of these goods when he writes “For without friends no one would choose
to live, though he had all other goods” (NE 1155a2-3). Friendship then, and character friendship
in particular, is a necessary component of the final or chief good in Aristotle’s view. It has
contributory value because it modifies the value experience of one’s life in a way that is not
merely causal. It is a necessary component of a flourishing life in the same way that earning
money to buy something one wants is a necessary component of the value experience one has
when enjoying the purchase.159 Aristotle, then, must explain how and why character friends
contribute such value to the final good of human life with the self-knowledge argument and the
argument that character friendships encourage moral activity.
The basic idea of the self-knowledge argument is that through one’s friend one can better
see one’s own desires, actions, and actualized conception of the good life. Aristotle writes:
… we can contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better than
our own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to good
men (since these have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant) – if this be so, the
supremely happy man will need friends of this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate
worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his
friend have both these qualities (NE 1169b34-1170a4).
This gives rise to a couple questions: what is the importance of knowing one’s own desires,
actions, and actualized conception of a good life and why is it that a character friend is necessary
to acquire this knowledge? The answer to the former question lies in Aristotle’s prerequisites for
a virtuous life and the answer to the latter lies in a more commonplace observation about human
nature.
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Throughout NE Aristotle shows that one must have self-knowledge in order to live a
good life. In book three he explains that in order to act virtuously a man must know who he is,
what he is doing, the principle he is acting on, and the end of the action (NE 1111a3-6). In book
two he emphasizes the need for the emotions to be felt at the right time, with the right motive, to
the right object, and in the right way (NE 1106b20-23). In order to habituate these emotions one
must first know what one feels and that those emotions are right. Moreover, one must have the
practical wisdom to know “… what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general” (NE
1140a28). As Cooper puts it in “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle,” hereafter FGA,
… having a good character, on Aristotle's theory, requires not merely correct practical
judgments (having a certain reasoned conception of how one ought to live) but also, and
even more, having this conception embedded in one's desires and thereby making it
effective in one's actions. Thus to know one is virtuous requires knowing (1) what the
desires are that in fact motivate one's actions, and (2) that these desires depend upon the
same scheme of ends as one's reasoned conception defines for one's life.160
Thus, for Aristotle one must know and choose the good life in addition to leading it to actually
be considered flourishing.
According to Aristotle, character friends play a vital role in gaining the self-knowledge
necessary for a human to flourish. In character friendships friends are alike in virtue (NE
1156b6-7). Thus, character friends will act similarly. Each friend will benefit from the
relationship by observing similar virtues and virtuous actions from a distance: this is conducive
to greater objectivity. Personal biases commonly affect one’s appraisal of one’s character and
work: one’s perception of vices is repressed and virtues amplified. The closeness to, and
similarities, with a character friend give one access to a mirror-like image in which it is often
160
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easier to recognize fault. For example, when Michelle witnesses Julie’s tendency to be overly
generous with her time she can come to recognize similarly excessive expressions of her own
generosity. Aristotelian character friends are close to one another, but their separateness
prevents at least some personal bias from interfering with judgments of one’s friends’ actions
and virtues. At the same time, the acknowledged similarity of character friends makes the
reapplication of those judgments to oneself relatively obvious. Cooper further explores the
usefulness of a character friend in self-assessing the character of even a perfectly virtuous
person:
To be sure, the qualities in himself he thinks virtuous are so, and he has no faults; but
how is he to be sure that he is not deceiving himself in thinking these things, as he must
be if he is to know what he is like? It is plausible to suggest, as our text does, that
mistakes of this kind are not so apt to occur where one is observing another person and
his life; here the facts, both about what are faults and what are virtues, are more likely, at
least to speak for themselves (FGA 298).
Nancy Sherman argues that the differences between character friends can provide significant self
knowledge as well:
But if another self need not be exactly similar, then self-knowledge might involve
contrasting oneself with another, and considering how another would have acted in the
same circumstances given that individual’s different point of view. Aristotle’s
introductory remarks in Metaphysics A have application here: ‘All human beings desire
to know by nature… and especially delight in discriminating differences’ (980a22-28).
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Self-knowledge, as a sub-species of knowledge, requires, ultimately, the discrimination
of what is peculiarly one’s own. Another and separate self facilitates that discovery.”161
For example, it is worthwhile for Michelle to compare her actions to those of Julie because,
though they are both virtuous, the relative mean of their generosities and the opportunities to
express that virtue might be significantly different. Thus, in contrasting her actions to those of
Julie, Michelle may come to learn something about her own virtue or its expression through
action.
The second argument that Aristotle gives to explain the value of character friendships is
that they promote activity. He writes
Further, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly. Now if he were a
solitary, life would be hard for him; for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active;
but with others and towards others it is easier. With others therefore his activity will be
more continuous, and it is in itself pleasant, as it ought to be for the man who is
supremely happy (NE 1170a4-9).
The happy man is, according to Aristotle, a virtuous one whose activities exemplify the virtues
(NE 1169b30-34). Therefore, the friendships that such a man fosters will help keep him
continuously active in ways that will exemplify the virtues. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not go
on to explain how friends are important to continuous activity. Cooper argues that no subject
matter is intrinsically interesting enough to continuously hold any individual’s attention
indefinitely (FGA 308). Instead, some external influence must compliment a person’s natural
attention in order to maintain her interest in even the most worthy of pursuits. He then goes on
to identify three reasons character friendship can be the supplement that humans need to
161
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maintain interest in an activity: friends provide one another with reinforcement that their pursuits
are meaningful, they increase one’s interest in and attachment to one’s activities, and they
enlarge the scope of one’s activity (FGA 308).162
By sharing one’s activity with a friend one is provided with the sense that one is not the
only person who finds a particular interest worthwhile: when Michelle and Julie volunteer
together they receive concrete evidence that they both see their work as important. Furthermore,
a character friend is someone who is morally good, so the confirmation comes from a reliably
moral source. Character friends share moral and intellectual pursuits. This means that the kinds
of activities being reaffirmed as valuable are those most vital to a flourishing life. Cooper
realizes that affirmation of an activity’s value need not come from character friends. One could
get such affirmation from the recognition that any other person one respects engages in it, but
Cooper writes
… what is in question here is not a person’s mere abstract knowledge that something is
valuable and worthwhile but his actual direct experience of it as worthwhile… In a
shared activity one knows of the commitment of others to the goodness of the activity in
no mere abstract theoretical way. It is concrete and immediate. Hence it is only through
participation in such activities that the confirmatory knowledge of others’ evaluations is
likely to be both constantly and directly present to one’s consciousness (FGA 306).
Thus, character friendships are necessary to maintain the virtuous activity that is a flourishing
life.
Cooper also argues that by sharing an activity friends can increase their attachment to,
and interest in, the activity. Michelle and Julie might enjoy working separately to raise money
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for the Special Olympics, but their character friendship and the experience of the effort as mutual
will likely increase their commitment to raising money and the effort they are willing to exert in
order to successfully raise money. Again, in cases like this the activity is shared with a character
friend so the commitments being supported are moral ones that are a necessary part of any
flourishing human life.
The third way that Cooper thinks friendships can keep one active is by expanding the
scope of one’s actions. Cooper argues that by being a member of a group working toward a
common end one indirectly participates in the work of other group members (FGA 307). He
bases this in the claim that “… one’s enjoyment, and so one’s interest in what one is doing, is not
limited just to what one directly does oneself” (FGA 307). If this is true, then even when one is
not actually active one can be said to be pursuing the activity indirectly through the efforts of
other group members; one is active in a sense that one pursuing a purely private interest cannot
be. According to Cooper, when Julie spends time during the week to organize a kickball
fundraiser for the Special Olympics and Michelle helps run the same fundraiser on Saturday and
Sunday morning, both are active all week long in the shared pursuit.163
Part III: Aristotelian Friendships: Not Intrinsically Valuable But Necessary to Final Goods
On Aristotle’s view, unlike Kant’s and Moore’s, intimate relationships are necessary to
the realization of final value. Kantianism cannot account for the moral value of intimate
relationships at all because motives based in emotion or interpersonal connections do not have
moral worth.164 On the other hand, Aristotle grants that motivations that spring from the right
emotions, which include love and affection in certain cases, are part of what make an action
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morally right (NE 1106b20-23). Moore is able to grant that intimate relationships have intrinsic
value, that their value comes from their internal properties, but is unable to recognize intimate
relationships as having final value because of the constraints of consequentialism’s normative
framework. Aristotle claims that friendship is desirable in itself and then provides the arguments
from increased self knowledge and increased activity to explain the value of the intimate
relationships he terms character friendships (NE 1159a25).
Aristotle makes the cultivation of appropriate emotional responses to situations a central
part of his general ethical theory. The doctrine of the mean explains that virtues involve feeling
the emotions neither too much nor too little, but always in the right amount, at the right time, to
the right object, and in the right way (NE 1106b18-23). Aristotle writes “Now virtue is
concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while
the intermediate is praised and is a form of success” (NE 1106b24-26). For Aristotle morally
appropriate emotional responses are important to any virtuous endeavor, including friendships.
For example, in his discussion of unequal friendships he writes “In all friendships implying
inequality the love also should be proportional…” (NE 1158b24-25). Additionally, as previously
explored, emotions are themselves a vital part of character friendships.165 Thus, how and when
one feels any of the emotions helps determine one’s moral character. As a result, the emotions
particularly related to intimate relationships, such as love for one’s friends or family members,
are of equally moral import according to Aristotle: how much love a father shows his son or a
woman shows her lover reveals part of those people’s moral characters.
Aristotle states that friendships are desirable in themselves (NE 1159a25). This might
indicate that intimate relationships have intrinsic and/or final value on his view. However, the
two arguments he gives to explain the value of character friendships seem to lead to a different
165
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conclusion. Neither the argument that character friends serve as second selves nor the argument
that they encourage moral activity show that intimate relationships have intrinsic value. Both
argue for the conclusion that character friendships are necessary components of the final good: a
flourishing human life. The value to be found according to these arguments is not in the
character friendships themselves but in their relationship to human life. If humans were
constituted differently, then character friendships might not be valuable at all.166 Thus, intimate
relationships are extrinsically valuable according to Aristotle. Yet, this fact does not prevent
them from contributing necessarily to the final value of a flourishing human life.
The normative framework of consequentialism subordinates the value of all intrinsic
goods to their place in a state of affairs that contains the maximal amount of goodness. On the
other hand, Aristotelian ethics recognizes the necessity of intimate relationships to the final good
of eudemonia. According to Moore’s theory, no particular friendship must be a part of the
maximally good state of affairs that is the end of moral action. In fact, it is possible that no
friendship at all would exist in a maximally good state of affairs.167 However, Aristotle’s two
arguments for the value of character friendships show that particular friendships must be a part
of a particular person’s flourishing, part of that person’s final good. Character friendships are
irreplaceable parts of the final good in Aristotle’s ethics and, therefore, have contributory value.
Alternately, they are eminently replaceable in Moore’s conception of the final good and, thus,
only instrumentally valuable. A return to Lewis’s example of contributory good can further
clarify this point.168 The work a boy does to earn the money for a circus ticket is not merely a
means to the pleasure he gets from going to the circus; the work is necessary to the final good of
pleasure that the boy gets. Without the work he puts into earning the ticket, the final good would
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be qualitatively and quantitatively different. According to Aristotle’s arguments for the value of
character friendships, the same is true of the good in a human life with friendship: it would be
both qualitatively and quantitatively different without the friendship. Yet, Moore’s
consequentialism cannot recognize the qualitative difference between two scenarios. The
quantitative difference a friendship makes in the final good is of sole importance in Moore’s
view, which is why any friendship is replaceable by any other good that would have the same
quantitative impact on the final good; in other words, no friendship is necessary to or has
contributory value towards the final good according to maximizing forms of consequentialism.
For Moore, all friendships must be only instrumentally good. Aristotle’s ability to recognize the
centrality of friendships to the final good of human flourishing enables his theory to avoid the
criticism leveled at Moore’s theory: that treating relationships as instrumentally valuable is
incompatible with recognizing them as intimate relationships.169 Aristotelian character
friendships have contributory value so Aristotle can consistently claim both that one should treat
one’s friends as ends in themselves and that those friendships are morally valuable even without
arguing for their intrinsic value.
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Chapter 7: The Value of Care and Relationships in the Ethics of Care
The ethics of care is a much younger approach to ethics but it is an approach built around
the idea that interpersonal relationships have moral value. As a result, the role of these
relationships and their value in the normative structure of the ethics of care is a bit more
straightforward than it is in the normative structure of any of the previously discussed theories.
A clear discussion of the value of care and relationships according to the ethics of care must
begin with an analysis of care itself and proceed to an explanation of the connection between
care and interpersonal relationships. Then, one can better appreciate value’s place in the ethics
of care and understand what type of value intimate relationships have according to the theory.
One of the clearest and most comprehensive accounts of care’s meaning in the ethics of care is
given by Virginia Held in The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, hereafter EOC.170
Thus, Held’s account of the ethics of care in EOC will be the specific version of the theory
explored in this dissertation.
Part I: What is Care and How is it Tied to Interpersonal Relationships
One would be correct to assume that a theory of ethics called the “ethics of care” places a
moral premium on the concept of “care.” Each theorist that considers himself or herself to be
developing an ethics of care defines “care” in a slightly different way. According to Held care
has several meanings: it is an activity, a practice, a standard, and a value.171
Care is an activity in the sense that it is a “form of labor” in which people care for others
and, in so doing, form caring interpersonal relationships.172 Held and, as she notes, many other
ethicists of care stress the idea that the work of actually caring for others is an important
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component of care’s definition.173 Actively caring for others can include actions without direct
contact between the people giving and receiving care.174 She also writes that care cannot be
broken down into individual events or even a string of such events (EOC 42). Rather, along with
the standard of the activity of caring they form a practice175.
Care is a standard as well as an activity according to Held, and in combination the two
form a practice. As a standard care can be used to judge the effectiveness of an actual caring
activity, the motive for the activity, whether it builds trust, whether it builds mutual concern, and
whether it builds connection (EOC 36, 42). A beneficent activity done without consideration for
the effectiveness of the activity cannot be considered good care. Such activities might harm
rather than help another person, and a lack of concern over this possibility shows a lack of care.
For example, if Steve tries to help Jared by having him drink excessive amounts of water when
Jared’s sodium levels are already depleted from a marathon, then Jared may be harmed by
Steve’s actions. Furthermore, if Steve is unconcerned with the effectiveness of his help or the
possibility of harming Jared, then he cannot be said to be caring for Jared. The practice of caring
for Jared would entail Steve actually doing what it takes to replenish Jared’s nutrients and fluids
effectively, motivated by his affection for Jared, in such a way that builds trust, mutual concern,
and connection between Jared and Steve. Thus, the reason one is helping is also relevant to the
activity’s qualification as care. Held writes, “Yet all care involves attentiveness, sensitivity, and
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responding to needs” (EOC 39). The motive behind an action must be appraised before judging
whether an action or practice can be considered caring. This point is made clearest in Held’s
evaluation of welfare policy: even if the dictates of justice are met fully by making substantial
payments to those with little or no income, without the correct motive the aid cannot be
considered good care. Without attentiveness, sensitivity, and responsiveness to the needs of
those receiving the payments such aid can be psychologically harmful and isolating (EOC 40).
Additionally, caring activity helps form and strengthens caring relationships by building trust,
mutual concern, and connection.176
Care is also a moral value on par with justice according to Held. As a value, care picks
out particular morally salient features of practices, people, and relationships (EOC 38). Thus,
rather than generally claiming that a particular practice of helping another is morally good,
saying that the practice is a caring practice would mean it is morally good in a specific way: it
meets or exceeds the standards of a caring practice previously discussed. Alternately, saying that
a particular interpersonal relationship is a caring one would mean that it is morally good because
it involves mutual concern, trust, responsiveness to the needs of the members of the relationship,
and feelings of connection between the members. Held later explains the source of care’s moral
value:
Care seems to me to be the most basic of moral values. Without care as an empirically
describable practice, we cannot have life at all since human beings cannot survive
without it. Without some level of caring concern for other human beings, we cannot have
any morality. These requirements are not just empirical givens. In every context of care,
moral evaluations are needed. Then, without some level of caring moral concern for all
other human beings, we cannot have a satisfactory moral theory (EOC 73).
176
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One of the features of the ethics of care that makes it different from the previously
discussed theories of ethics is the centrality of interpersonal relationships. Most ethicists of care,
including Held, criticize the liberal individualism of Kantianism, utilitarianism, and even
Aristotelian ethics. They find the idea that the ideal, or even normal, moral human agent is an
unencumbered individual actor influencing the world around her to be dramatically flawed. This
view misrepresents the actual state of human beings as necessarily dependent on others at least
during their youth and, frequently, interdependent on others throughout their lives (EOC 14).
Yet, the view that humans act as individuals uninfluenced morally by their relationships
is the one that informs Kantian and consequentialist ethics. Kant places the highest value on the
good will, the cultivation of which requires no help or relationships with others.177 Similarly,
Moore’s version of consequentialism envisions the moral agent as an individual who must
objectively choose whichever action creates the most good.178 Even Aristotle for the greater part
of the Nicomachean Ethics focuses on the individual’s cultivation of a virtuous character.179
In contrast, Held emphasizes the connectedness of individuals to one another. She
clearly states “It is characteristic of the ethics of care to view persons as relational and as
interdependent… to many care theorists persons are at least partly constituted by their social
ties” (EOC 46). She also points out that autonomy itself can be conceived of as a relational
ability:
Often, we learn to be autonomous through our interactions with others though we are not
prisoners of our upbringings and circumstances. Our personal, familial, social, political,
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and economic relations with others enable or inhibit our access to significant options.
And we are both enmeshed in and capable of shaping such relations (EOC 48).

Thus, each individual human is necessarily involved in some interpersonal relationships.
It is this environment in which caring as an activity, practice, standard, and value can be
cultivated. Caring, in all its forms, is necessarily tied to the existence of interpersonal
relationships which are a necessary part of human life. The caring that Held discusses cannot
take place outside of interpersonal relationships. Held stresses the ties between the concepts of
caring and interpersonal relationships repeatedly. She writes, “Caring is a relation in which carer
and cared-for share an interest in their mutual well-being” (EOC 34-35). She adds, “In my view,
as we clarify care, we need to see it in terms of caring relations” (EOC 36). She drives home the
point again as she writes:
Care is not the same as benevolence, in my view, since it is more the characterization of a
social relation than the description of an individual disposition, and social relations are
not reducible to individual states… The values of care are especially exemplified in
caring relations, rather than in persons as individuals (EOC 42).
Of course, not all interpersonal relationships are caring relationships, in the sense that they are
morally valuable. Some relationships may be morally neutral and some may be morally bad
(EOC 37). However, caring in all its forms occurs only in the midst of interpersonal
relationships.
Part II. The Ethics of Care as Distinct from Virtue Theory
One important question facing the ethics of care is how it is different from virtue ethics.
This question is significant for the status of the ethics of care as a distinct approach to normative
ethics but also for the purposes of this dissertation. If the ethics of care collapses into virtue
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theory, then the actual value of intimate relationships may not be different on Aristotle’s and
Held’s views. Some theorists often labeled as ethicists of care do describe normative theories
that are very similar to virtue ethics. Michael Slote and Lawrence Blum both describe care as a
virtue.180 Sara Ruddick too spends a great deal of effort discussing the virtues.181 However,
Held clearly draws a line between her version of the ethics of care and virtue theory. In
criticizing Blum’s approach to care, Held writes:
… he sees the care virtues, in line with the virtue theory tradition, as altruistic
dispositions of individuals and psychological motivations. This misses the heart of what
goes on in practices of caring and misses what is of most value in them, which is that
they are caring relations. What I am suggesting is that care, if not the traditional virtues,
can extricate us from the overly personal perspective of the virtue tradition and the
excessive contemporary focus on individual psychology… (EOC 35).
Held also argues that viewing care as a virtue entails too much of a focus on dispositions and
motives thus losing sight of the equal import morality should accord actual work (EOC 35, 51).
For example, Jared may ascribe to virtue theory and focus his attention on cultivating his
sensitivity to and affection for Steve at the expense of actually helping Steve when he needs
assistance. One might wonder how this is possible when many virtue theorists, such as Aristotle,
try to tie action so closely to virtue.182 While virtue theorists do discuss the importance of action,
the moral value of action is often less clear. The virtues and character of the individual become
the focal point of moral value. Thus, according to Held, Jared may act whenever Steve needs
assistance, but by following virtue theory he risks losing sight of the moral importance of those
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actions relative to the virtues as well as the moral importance of the relationship itself. Were
Jared to subscribe to the ethics of care instead of virtue theory he would remain aware of his
motives and dispositions while assigning equal value to the labor of caring for Steve. This
would also help reinforce Jared’s concern for the effectiveness of his efforts in caring for Steve.
According to Held, then, there are significant differences between virtue theory and the ethics of
care: virtue theory is unable to directly assign value to the relationships themselves or the work
that helps constitute them.
Part III. Intimate Relationships as Caring Relationships
The definition of caring relationships explained by Held is broader than the definition of
intimate relationships. Nevertheless, relationships in which the members love one another, wish
one another well, act for one another, do so mutually or for one another, and trust that each loves
and wishes the other well as an end in himself are a subset of caring relations. Held references
each component of intimate relationships in her discussion of relationships that embody all four
meanings of care, which will hereafter simply be termed “caring relationships.”
The most notable difference between a caring relationship’s and an intimate
relationship’s requirements is that the members of the relationship love one another. This is not
a necessary component of a caring relationship, but it does support the requirement that the
members of a caring relationship feel connected with one another. Additionally, in explaining
her disagreement with Diemut Bubeck’s ethic of care Held supports the idea that properly aimed
affection does contribute to some caring relationships (EOC 32). This is again reflected in
Held’s focus on the motive behind an action as being an important piece of a caring practice
(EOC 33). Therefore, though love is not necessary to a caring relationship it can certainly help
by providing connectedness and the right motive to support a caring practice.
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Held addresses the importance of wishing one another well in a caring relationship when
she discusses the importance of concern for others in a relationship and the appropriate motives
involved in caring practices. She mentions several times that mutual concern is a vital part of
caring relationships (EOC 36, 38, 42). Moreover, she explains that “… merely going through the
motions of a caring activity and doing the work – for instance feeding the infant, but without any
of the appropriate feelings or intentions of seeking her well-being – would not be caring either”
(EOC 54).183 Thus, the people in caring relationships do wish one another well as do people in
intimate relationships.
Perhaps more important to Held, however, is the idea that people in caring relationships
do not stop at merely wishing one another well but act on these wishes to help one another be
well. The activity of care is, after all, considered “work” and “labor” in the sense that it is
helping others (EOC 36). As discussed previously, actively caring for others is a central part of
the definition of care that can only take place in relationships.
In intimate relationships each member of the relationship is treated as an end in herself.
Held’s discussion does not, on the surface, address this as a requirement for caring relationships.
Yet, a closer look shows that there are strong similarities between how people in intimate and
caring relationships treat one another. Throughout Held’s explanation of caring relationships
there are many instances in which it becomes apparent that people in caring relationships do not
treat one another merely as means to some other end. The notions of mutual respect and mutual
autonomy to which Held refers offer strong evidence to suggest that caring relationships, like
intimate ones, involve people who treat one another as more than means to other ends. In
comparing caring relationships to relationships that are ultimately harmful, Held concludes that
“The person who participates in an admirable practice of care will not only respect himself but
183
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will foster mutual respect and mutual sensitivity” (EOC 56). The idea of mutual respect not only
implies self respect and respect of the other in a relationship, but would also seem to be at odds
with the treatment of either member of the relationship as a means to an end. This is further
supported by the examples of harmful relationships, a servile housewife and martyr mother, in
which the women are treating themselves as means to some other ends (EOC 56). Held’s
exploration of mutual autonomy also bolsters this view:
Mutual autonomy… includes mutual understandings and acceptances of how much
sharing of time, space, daily decisions, and so on there will be, and how much
independently arrived at activity… The tendency to equate caring with a kind of
overbearing attention, benevolent but smothering, is a distorted but widespread view of
care. Care as a disposition often misleads people into thinking they are caring when they
only have the good motives of wanting to care, to help others, to be benevolent, and so
on, however much the intention misrepresents the recipient’s wishes and perceptions and
however much such good intentions may fail to contribute to a caring relation (EOC 55).

The idea that the understanding and acceptance of decisions must be mutual supports an
inference to the conclusion that people in caring relationships must treat one another as goals not
means, especially when coupled with the previously mentioned focus on people not treating
themselves as a means to an end. The importance of mutual understanding and acceptance of
decisions is especially evident in the practice of care that exists for hospice and palliative care
patients. In these instances it is vitally important that there is a strong emphasis on
communication between the patient and caregiver so that the goals of both are clear and aligned.
Held’s critique of non-caring relationships also shows that benevolent intentions are not enough
to ground caring relationships. Moreover, in several instances she asserts that people in caring
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relationships respond to and are motivated by one another as particular persons and not as mere
representatives of humanity or by universal principles of benevolence.184 Thus, people in caring
relationships treat one another neither as means to an end nor as the objects of universal
benevolence: people in caring relationships treat one another much the same as those in intimate
relationships. One might then, justifiably, wonder why Held does not ever mention treating
others in caring relationships as ends in themselves. The reason for this omission may lie in
Held’s belief that the caring relationship is not completely distinct from the individuals in it
(EOC 46, 101). The relationship is an end in itself, and to envision each individual in the
relationship as an end in himself that is completely separable from the relationship would be to
skew what Held sees as the reality of caring relationships.185 Alternately, Held may simply
believe that the notion of respecting others covers the relevant moral considerations.186
Nevertheless, what is important about people in intimate relationships treating one another as
ends in themselves is captured in Held’s description of how people in caring relationships should
treat one another: that they treat one another as goals rather than means and as particular
individuals.187
For a relationship to be considered a caring one, the relationship cannot be unidirectional:
there must be some reciprocation. This point is addressed in several places in EOC. Held states
that “A caring relationship requires mutuality and the cultivation of ways of achieving this in the
various contexts of interdependence in human life” (EOC 53). She also writes of mutual concern
between members of a caring relationship and pursuing mutual interests.188 Held adds that “In
normal cases, recipients of care sustain caring relations through their responsiveness – the look
184
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of satisfaction in the child, the smile of the patient” (EOC 36). The importance of mutuality is
also acknowledged indirectly when Held describes harmful relationships that become too onesided such as those that become dominating or exploitative (EOC 37). Held is also clear in
stating that the mutuality does not have to be even and that the members of a relationship need
not be equals.189 For example, the previous quote references the “look of satisfaction in the
child” and “the smile of a patient” which, most often, do not approximate the work of a parent or
health care practitioner in garnering those responses. Furthermore, neither parents and children
nor health care practitioners and patients are equals in terms of authority or power over one
another.190 Caring relationships, then, are the same as intimate relationships in that both require
mutuality between the members but do not require that the reciprocation between members or the
members themselves be equal.
Held is very clear that trust is also a necessary component of caring relationships. She
explains that “Care is not the same thing as trust, but caring relations should be characterized by
trust, and caring and trust sustain each other” and “… good caring relations require and are
characterized by [trust]” (EOC 42, 56). Thus, both intimate relationships and caring
relationships must be trusting relationships.
Part IV. The Final Value of Intimate Relationships in the Ethics of Care
Intimate relationships are a subset of caring relationships, distinguished primarily by the
love one feels for the other in an intimate relationship. Thus, whatever value caring relationships
are accorded by Held will be shared by intimate relationships. Held never uses the terms
intrinsic, extrinsic, or final value in EOC but there is evidence that implies she views caring
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relationships as having final value. For example, in comparing virtue theory’s emphasis on
dispositions to the ethics of care she writes: “Caring relations have primary value” (EOC 19).
Later, she decries the view that relationships should be valued only instrumentally as serving
individual interests (EOC 101). She also explains on several occasions that caring as a practice,
and by implication the relationships in which caring takes place, is a value as morally important
as that of justice.191 It is clear that deontological theories of justice see justice as more than a
means, but as an end in itself.192 It also seems clear throughout Held’s writing, in which caring
relationships have such a central role, that these relationships are not mere means to some other
ends but are valued as ends-in-themselves, as final goods. If the ethics of care places the highest
value on the notion of care as a practice, then certainly the relationships that embody that care
are a close second if not inseparable first.
On the other hand, it is a bit less obvious whether caring relationships are intrinsically or
extrinsically valuable according to the ethics of care. If forced to choose between the two Held
believes that caring relationships are intrinsically valuable.193 Since caring relationships are
central to the ethics of care it makes sense to think of them as intrinsically valuable. An ethicist
of care applying G.E. Moore’s isolation test to caring relationships would be unlikely to deny the
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worth of a caring relationship even if it were the only thing that exists. Thus, unlike Aristotelian
friendships caring relationships, and by implication intimate relationships, are valuable as final
and intrinsic goods according to Held.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
Intimate relationships are those interpersonal relationships that deeply connect people
with one another. Some of these relationships are entered into freely and exist between people
with no authority and power over one another such as those between close friends. Other
intimate relationships are established in large part by the circumstances of one’s birth and exist
between people of unequal authority and power over one another such as those between parents
and their children. In both cases, however, relationships in which the members love one another,
wish one another well, act for one another, do so mutually, and trust that each loves and wishes
the other well as an end in himself are morally valuable. On this point each of the theorists this
dissertation examines agrees. Immanuel Kant declares that there is a duty to cultivate
friendships, a subset of intimate relationships.194 G.E. Moore considers the goods of friendships
to be highly intrinsically valuable.195 Aristotle writes clearly at the beginning of book VIII in
Nicomachean Ethics, “For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other
goods.”196 Virginia Held recognizes caring relationships, of which intimate relationships are a
subset, as focal points of moral value.197 The normative theories proposed by Kant and Moore,
however, fail to accommodate their own views on the moral import of friendships. Aristotle’s
and Held’s normative theories can successfully account for the moral value they attribute to
intimate relationships. An examination of each theory’s failure or success reveals some of the
necessary and sufficient conditions that a normative theory must meet in order to account for the
moral value of friendships. Additionally, several other notable conclusions about the value of
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intimate relationships according to normative theories can be made from said examination:
intimate relationships need not be assigned intrinsic value, morally valuable relationships need
not be restricted to friendships, it is helpful for a normative theory to acknowledge humans’
social natures, and it is helpful for a normative theory to recognize the moral value of particular
things in the world.
Part I: Necessary Conditions for a Normative Theory’s Ability to Capture the Value of
Intimate Relationships
Kant’s ethics is unable to account for the value of intimate relationships such as
friendships because on his view motives of attachment, such as love, and the actions to which
they give rise have no moral value.198 Kant’s insistence that the sole moral motive is reason’s
respect for duty causes two interrelated problems when his theory is used to appraise the worth
of intimate relationships. First, a necessary component of intimate relationships, the love that
exists between the members of the relationship, remains morally unappreciated by Kant’s view.
Kantians can assign positive moral value to other components of intimate relationships, for
example the members’ willingness to act for one another as ends. However, the lack of moral
focus on love and the attachment between those in intimate relationships leaves any moral value
that exists in these relationships unconnected to the particular individuals in those relationships.
In other words, even when two close friends treat one another as ends in themselves, and are
motivated by reason alone, their actions are not morally different from two similarly motivated
strangers treating one another as ends in themselves. Furthermore, insofar as the actions that
nurture intimate relationships are motivated by love of the individual other rather than reason
they are not morally valuable at all: treating another as an end in himself is morally good only so
long as one is doing so in response to duty’s dictates. Kant’s unwillingness to admit either
198
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emotions or particular other people as moral motivations results in his normative theory’s
inability to recognize friendship, or any other intimate relationship, as morally valuable.199
This leads to the first condition that a normative theory must meet in order to
acknowledge the moral value of intimate relationships.
Necessary Condition 1: The love that exists between those in intimate relationships or the
actions motivated by this love must be candidates for moral goodness. Not every
instance of love between intimate relations or every action motivated by love must be
morally good according to a normative theory but at least some must.
Kantianism’s failure in this regard forces Barbara Herman, who would like to salvage the value
of intimate relationships in Kantian ethics, to conclude that their value lies outside the sphere of
morality.200 Love for another as an end in himself is a necessary component of intimate
relationships. Any normative theory that excludes love or all actions that are motivated by love
from the realm of moral value will be unable to capture the value of intimate relationships.
Therefore, it is a necessary condition of a normative theory’s ability to recognize the value of
intimate relationships that the theory includes some instances of love or some actions motivated
by love among the valuable things in the world.201 This condition is necessary, but not
sufficient. Moore’s theory is an example that proves this to be true. Though Moore’s,
Aristotle’s, and Held’s normative theories all value love as good or as a good motive for action,
Moore’s theory is still unable to account for the value of intimate relationships such as
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friendships.202 The ability of Moore’s consequentialism to assign value to love and actions
motivated by love is not enough to ensure that the theory can appreciate the value of intimate
relationships.
Moore’s consequentialism assigns intrinsic value to friendships, but it is unable to
account for the value of intimate relationships because only maximally good states of affairs
have final value.203 Moore’s consequentialism combines his particular value theory with the
traditional consequentialist normative structure. In terms of valuing friendships, his axiology is
promising. Unlike Kant, Moore’s axiology highly values love in the form of personal affection.
However, the normative structure of consequentialism recognizes only states of affairs
containing the greatest amount of good as final ends. According to Moore’s consequentialism
the only thing that is an end in itself, the only thing that is a goal rather than a means, is that
attainable version of the world that contains the greatest amount of good. This valuation of
goods is incompatible with the recognition of intimate relationships. Intimate relationships by
definition, including friendships by Moore’s definition, exist between people who value one
another and the relationship that exists between them as final goods, or ends in themselves.204
No particular Moorean friendship is a necessary part of the maximally good state of affairs that is
the final good according to consequentialism. For example, Steve must value Shivang and the
relationship that exists between them as final ends for that relationship to meet the criteria of an
intimate relationship. However, consequentialism’s normative structure makes it unable to
recognize either Shivang or the relationship between Steve and Shivang as a final end: both
Shivang and the relationship may need to be sacrificed as a means to the production of a
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maximally good state of affairs. On the other hand, if Shivang and the relationship are a part of
the maximally good state of affairs according to Moore’s consequentialism they are preserved or
further cultivated only as a means to their part in the maximally good state of affairs. They can
in neither case be accorded final value by Moore’s consequentialism.
This provides the basis of another condition that any normative theory must meet in order
to accurately detail the value of intimate relationships.
Necessary Condition 2: A normative theory must value individuals in relationships as
final ends, or ends in themselves.
This condition, in conjunction with the first, allows for the induction of several more necessary
conditions.
Normative theories that cannot assign final value to individuals cannot address the value
of intimate relationships because they fail to recognize a component piece of those relationships.
An interpersonal relationship that qualifies as an intimate one must involve individuals who
recognize one another as final goods. Similarly, a normative theory that recognizes only
instrumental value in individuals cannot acknowledge the existence of intimate relationships as
morally valuable entities, because it denies the existence of one part of intimate relationships:
people who have final value. This condition of a normative theory’s ability to capture the value
of intimate relationships is necessary because any theory that fails to accommodate the view that
people have final value cannot recognize the existence of intimate relationships as morally
valuable.
This problem parallels the problem which gives rise to the first necessary condition for a
normative theory’s ability to account for the value of intimate relationships. In both cases the
condition arises as a result of a normative theory’s failure to value one component of an intimate
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relationship’s definition. In the first case it is Kantianism’s inability to accept love or actions
motivated by love as morally good that leads to the conclusion that all normative theories must
admit that some instances of love or some actions motivated by love have moral value in order to
appreciate the moral value of intimate relationships. In the second case, it is Moore’s theory of
ethics that fails to leave room for a particular piece of an intimate relationship’s definition: that
the people in intimate relationships are ends in themselves. In both cases the conditions are
necessary but not sufficient. The parallels of these two examples provide the premises of an
induction to further necessary conditions:
Necessary Conditions 3-6: A normative theory that can account for the value of intimate
relationships must not explicitly or implicitly exclude the moral value of all instances of
wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so mutually, and trusting one
another.
These conditions, like the two already addressed, are each necessary: the failure of a normative
theory to meet any one of them would prevent that theory from acknowledging the existence of
intimate relationships. However, no one condition is sufficient as is evidenced by Moorean
consequentialism’s satisfaction of necessary condition 1, Kantianism’s satisfaction of necessary
condition 2 and both theories’ failures to account for the value of intimate relationships.
Each of these six necessary conditions is more conservative than it might be. An
alternate version of necessary conditions 1-6 is:
Aggressive Version of Necessary Conditions 1-6: any normative theory that can account
for the value of intimate relationships must assign value to some instances of loving
another, wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that treats
the other as an end in himself, doing so mutually, and trusting one another.
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In addition to the more precarious nature of the aggressive conditions, these conditions also have
the drawback of being uncharitable when applied to various normative theories. This is why I
will not defend the more aggressive versions of the conditions. My reason for wanting to remain
charitable in applying these conditions to particular normative theories will be made clearer
when I examine the sufficient condition for a normative theory’s ability to account for the value
of intimate relationships in the next section. Furthermore, I will also address whether or not
these conditions are jointly sufficient to a normative theory’s ability to account for the value of
intimate relationships in the next section.
Part II: A Sufficient Condition for a Normative Theory’s Ability to Capture the Value of
Intimate Relationships
Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories succeed where Kant’s and Moore’s fail: they
are able to capture the value of intimate relationships. Their theories do not explicitly or
implicitly deny the value of any of the criteria of intimate relationships. Additionally, both
theories grant that intimate relationships are more than merely instrumentally valuable. This
leads to a sufficient condition for a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate
relationships: any normative theory that recognizes intimate relationships as more than
instrumentally valuable will be able to assign value to intimate relationships.
Aristotle provides two arguments to explain his claim that friendships, which are intimate
relationships, are good: the argument that friendships aid in the acquisition of self-knowledge
and the argument that friendships encourage moral activity.205 Each of these arguments supports
the contributory value of friendships to the final good. The final value of eudaimonia cannot be
reached without friendships. Friendships, according to Aristotle, are not simply valuable as a
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means to eudaimonia, but as a vital component of the sort of life that can achieve the final good.
Friendships do not just cause the value of eudaimonia, but actually modify the experienced value
of a well-lived life. Aristotle also notes the centrality of interpersonal relationships to the
definition of a human. He writes: “…man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live
with others.”206 Furthermore, he notes “Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by
nature; for man is naturally inclined to form couples…”207
Held goes even further than Aristotle and argues that caring relationships, of which
intimate relationships are a subset, possess final and intrinsic value. According to Held, caring
relationships are ends in themselves.208 Held too explains the necessity of caring relationships to
human life when she writes “Without care as an empirically describable practice, we cannot have
life at all since human beings cannot survive without it.”209 Caring relationships act as a locus
for caring activities, a place for those activities to occur.
Aristotle and Held’s success in capturing the value of intimate relationships is directly
related to their arguments for the value of intimate relationships as being more than
instrumental.210 Both normative theories meet the necessary conditions described in the previous
section, but they also go further and attribute more than instrumental value to intimate
relationships themselves. Therefore, another condition for a normative theory’s ability to
recognize the value of intimate relationships is:
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Sufficient Condition 1: A normative theory must ascribe more than instrumental value to
intimate relationships.
This condition is sufficient, because any normative theory that can consistently describe the
value of intimate relationships as being more than instrumental will be able to capture the value
of intimate relationships. It is also important to note that any theory that can consistently explain
the value of intimate relationships as being more than instrumental will also meet all the
necessary conditions mentioned in the previous section. There would have to be inconsistencies
in any normative theory that explicitly or implicitly denied the value of any component piece of
an intimate relationship and still assigned final value, for example, to intimate relationships.
Many normative theories, however, may fail to specifically address the value of each component
piece of an intimate relationship’s definition. Yet, if a normative theory assigns final goodness
to some intimate relationships and there is no evidence that the theory explicitly or implicitly
denies the value of any component piece of these relationships one may charitably grant there are
no internal inconsistencies in the theory and that it does successfully capture the value of
intimate relationships. This is the reason I chose more charitable formulations of the necessary
conditions explained in the previous section. It is also worth noting that even when combined
necessary conditions 1-6 are not coextensive with the sufficient condition currently under
discussion. The necessary conditions discussed in the previous section only require that a
normative theory allow for some value of the component pieces of intimate relationships. Those
conditions do not specify that the value of the component pieces must be final values, except in
the case of necessary condition two where treatment as a final value is part of the criterion itself.
For example, the mutuality that exists in intimate relationships could be appraised by a
normative theory as a means to each person’s happiness rather than as a final good. This value
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judgment would be logically compatible with the existence of an intimate relationship. So even
if individually valuing each component of an intimate relationship was equivalent to valuing the
relationship as a whole, there is still a difference between the kind of values addressed by the
necessary conditions discussed previously and the sufficient condition under present discussion.
Aristotle’s and Held’s successes in accounting for the value of intimate relationships, along with
Kant’s and Moore’s failures, would also support an induction to the conclusion that this
sufficient condition is also a necessary condition. Kant’s and Moore’s theories fail to meet the
necessary conditions discussed in the previous section but they also fail to meet the sufficient
condition. Kantianism’s inability to assign moral value to love or any action it motivates
prevents Kantianism from assigning value to intimate relationships themselves. Moore’s version
of consequentialism is no better at treating intimate relationships as final goods or necessary to
the final good than it is at treating the people in an intimate relationship as final goods or
necessary to the final good. Thus, the two theories that fail to appreciate the moral value of
intimate relationships cannot assign final value or value necessary to final value to intimate
relationships. On the other hand, the two theories that successfully account for the value of
intimate relationships both recognize those relationships as having more than instrumental
goodness. Despite this evidence, it may still be logically, if not actually possible, for a normative
theory to meet the necessary conditions described in the last section, assign intimate relationships
only instrumental value, and still capture the value of intimate relationships. This logical
possibility makes it equally difficult to answer whether the necessary conditions described in the
previous section are jointly sufficient for a normative theory’s ability to recognize the value of
intimate relationships. To be clear:
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If appraising the value of intimate relationships as more than instrumental is a necessary
condition of a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate relationships
then the necessary conditions are not jointly sufficient. Conversely, if appraising the
value of intimate relationships as more than instrumental is not a necessary condition of
a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate relationships then the
necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for a normative theory’s ability to capture the
value of intimate relationships.
Part III: Other Conclusions
Through the examination of the four normative theories’ abilities to capture the value of
intimate relationships several other important points about these abilities have been revealed: it is
unnecessary for a normative theory to assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships, it is
unnecessary to limit the sphere of valuable relationships to friendships, it is helpful for a
normative theory to understand humans as necessarily social or co-dependent beings, it is helpful
for a normative theory to be particularistic as opposed to universalistic.
The point made in chapter three, that assigning intrinsic value to intimate relationships is
unnecessary to a normative theory’s ability to capture the moral value of intimate relationships,
was verified by the examination of the four normative theories. Moore’s consequentialism as
well as Held’s ethics of care both assigned intrinsic value to intimate relationships, yet Moore’s
theory still ultimately fails to appreciate the value of these relationships. Conversely, while
neither Aristotle’s nor Kant’s theories understand intimate relationships as being intrinsically
valuable only Aristotle’s is able to account for the moral value of those relationships. The
preceding discussion proves that it is neither necessary nor an impediment to a theory’s ability to
account for the value of intimate relationships to assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships.
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This is important because normative theories have been criticized because of the inability to
assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships.211
The discussion of the previous chapters also shows that restricting the set of morally
valuable relationships to friendships does not help a theory capture the moral value of
relationships. Kant most explicitly limits the set of morally valuable relationships to friendships
by emphasizing the need for equality between friends as a result of the tenuous nature of
friendship’s balance of respect and mutual love.212 This description is in line with Neera
Badhwar’s and Laurence Thomas’ descriptions of friendship which each contain a criterion of
equality between those in the relationship.213 Yet, Kant’s focus on equality does not allow his
theory to acknowledge the moral value of such relationships. In fact, Aristotle and Held, who
are both willing to value relationships between unequals, are the theorists who propose
normative theories that successfully capture the moral value of some interpersonal relationships.
One cannot conclude from this that friendships are no more valuable than other forms of intimate
relationships. One can, however, conclude that the criterion of equality, when added to the other
criteria of intimate relationships more generally, does not specially entail moral value of
relationships that would otherwise not contain any moral value.
A noteworthy similarity between Aristotle’s and Held’s account of intimate relationships’
values is the place they give relationships in human life. Both see interpersonal relationships as
an absolutely necessary piece of any human life. For Aristotle, what it means to be human and
what it means to lead a good human life are interconnected. Thus, after explaining that “…man
211
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is born for citizenship” it comes as no surprise that his account of moral life includes intimate
relationships as a necessary component.214 Books IIX and IX of Nicomachean Ethics are
necessary to a full explanation of a good human life because part of what it means to be human
according to Aristotle is to be enmeshed in social relationships. Held recognizes the centrality of
interpersonal relationships to human life as well. In arguing for the necessity of care to human
life she points out the fact that humans cannot survive without others.215 Human infants are
biologically incapable of caring for themselves. Thus, everyone who survives past infancy must
have some interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, anyone who survives to an age at which one
can live a solitary life can only do so as a result of one’s past interpersonal relationships that
nurtured the capability to live alone. Held’s acknowledgement of these points transitions
smoothly into an argument for her conclusions about the moral value of intimate relationships.
On the other hand, Kant’s and Moore’s normative theories are, in a sense, disconnected from
their views about interpersonal relationships. Kant’s view of morality is grounded in a human’s
ability to rationally recognize one’s moral duties, and one requires no other person to exercise it.
For Moore, though intimate relationships are intrinsically valuable, they are not necessary to the
final good at which every moral human must aim. By setting up interpersonal relationships as a
necessary part of human life, both Aristotle and Held make it easier to incorporate the moral
value of intimate relationships into their normative theories. Assigning moral value to intimate
relationships is a logical step for a normative theory that acknowledges the necessity of
interpersonal relationships to human life as part of its foundation. A theory such as Kant’s or
Moore’s that is not grounded in similar views about what it means to be human will need to
214
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make a more circuitous, less obvious, argument for including intimate relationships among the
set of morally valuable objects. This is not to say it is impossible for a theory with a different
foundation to acknowledge the moral value of intimate relationships, but it would likely be more
difficult.
Another revealing similarity between Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories is their
focus on the value of particular objects. Neither theory acknowledges universal rules of morality
that must be followed or universal standards to justify moral value, but both are able to explain
the moral value of intimate relationships. Kant’s and Moore’s theories, on the other hand, do
appeal to universal standards of right and wrong and have trouble accounting for the moral value
of intimate relationships. These connections may be more than mere correlation. The problem
with appeals to universal moral standards is that they make it difficult to admit of the value in
particular objects. This issue was described in the introduction in relation to the Christian
concept of agape: when love is universal it also fails to distinguish between individuals.
However, the love that exists between those people in intimate relationships must distinguish
between the other in the relationship and others with whom one is not in a relationship. In fact,
part of what it means to treat the other in an intimate relationship as an end in himself is to
recognize her as an individual.216 This is partially responsible for Kantianism’s problem
recognizing the moral value of intimate relationships: even when one treats another as an end in
himself, for the action to have moral worth it must be motivated by abstract reason and an appeal
to a universal standard of goodness as opposed to love, which focuses on the particulars of
another person.217 Moore’s version of consequentialism is prevented from acknowledging the
value of intimate relationships by its appeal to the universal rule that the morally right action is
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one that maximizes the good. Due to the theory’s appeal to a universal rule all particular goods
are made instrumental to the realization of the final good: that state of affairs in which the good
has been maximized. Therefore, no particular other person or intimate relationship can be a final
good.218 Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories do not need to resolve such conflicts between
universal rules or justifications and particular intimate relationships. As a result, they have fewer
obstacles to impede their valuation of intimate relationships. This does not prove that it is
impossible for a normative theory that appeals to a universal rule or standard to recognize the
moral value of intimate relationships, but it does give one reason to think that normative theories
that lack such appeals have an easier time recognizing intimate relationships’ values.
Intimate relationships are deeply valuable to those people involved in them and this value
is not merely subjective. There is moral value in intimate relationships: those relationships in
which the members love one another, wish one another well, act for one another, do so mutually,
and trust that each loves and wishes the other well as an end in himself. In order for a normative
theory to account for this value it must necessarily not explicitly or implicitly exclude the moral
value of all instances of wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that
treats the other as an end in himself, doing so mutually, and trusting one another. Furthermore,
any normative theory that values intimate relationships as more than instrumentally good can
account for the moral value of those relationships. It is unnecessary for normative theories to
assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships or to narrow the range of valuable relationships to
friendships in order to assign moral value to interpersonal relationships. It is easier, though, for a
normative theory that recognizes the necessity of interpersonal relationships to human life and
the value in particular objects and people to account for the moral value of normative
relationships. Theories like Kant’s and Moore’s fail to meet the necessary conditions that in
218

See Chapter 5 part IV for a deeper analysis of this.

Page 136

order to account for the value of intimate relationships a normative theory must not explicitly or
implicitly exclude the moral value of all instances to some instances of loving another, wishing
one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that treats the other as an end in
himself, doing so mutually, and trusting one another. Therefore, they lack the ability to describe
the moral value of romantic couples, close friendships, parent-child relationships, and other
intimate relationships that are part of everyone’s life from time to time. They act as filters that
fail to capture some of the moral landscape’s most interesting colors. Theories like Aristotle’s
and Held’s, on the other hand, that meet the necessary conditions described above and the
sufficient condition of assigning more than instrumental value to intimate relationships more
faithfully capture these colors and the way in which they tint our moral view of the world.
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